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DISCRIMINATION STATUTES, THE
COMMON LAW, AND PROXIMATE
CAUSE
Sandra F. Sperino*
The Supreme Court recently interpreted causal language in the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA) to include the common-law concept of proximate cause.
This Article anticipates that courts will incorporate proximate cause
more broadly into the primary federal discrimination statutes and ar-
gues that courts should not interpret the statutes in this way. The Ar-
ticle demonstrates the theoretical and practical difficulties of import-
ing proximate cause principles into employment discrimination law.
The Article demonstrates how only weak textual, intent, or pur-
pose-based arguments support courts' use of proximate cause in Title
VIL Many of these arguments are premised on the idea that the fed-
eral discrimination statutes are torts. This Article challenges this as-
sumption and argues that describing a cause of action as a tort does
not provide any meaningful guidance about whether to import prox-
imate cause. Proximate cause is a notoriously flexible and theoreti-
cally inconsistent concept. Proximate cause has no independent de-
scriptive power and is highly dependent on the underlying tort to
which it is attached. Employment discrimination claims do not fit
within any traditional tort and therefore do not align well with tradi-
tional articulations of proximate cause.
When courts import proximate cause, they are not simply im-
porting a concept from the common law, but rather are engaging in
an unguided policy choice-a choice that will allow courts to further
limit the reach of federal discrimination law. Importantly, the federal
discrimination statutes already contain express limits on liability that
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Allen, William Corbett, Joan Howarth, Emily Houh, Brad Mank, Darrell Miller, Noga Morag-Levine,
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and Employment Law, the University of Cincinnati College of Law Summer Workshop Series, and the
Michigan State University College of Law Junior Faculty Workshop. Christian Dennery provided
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eliminate or severely constrain the space available for courts to im-
port and define proximate cause.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recently hinted that courts should apply
proximate cause to federal discrimination statutes.' This Article antici-
pates future judicial forays into this area and argues that courts should
not make proximate cause an element of a federal discrimination claim.
This Article is part of a broader conversation about how the courts have
been inattentive to the dangers inherent in applying proximate cause to
federal statutes generally. 2 Importing proximate cause raises profound
questions about the nature of discrimination law and its interaction with
the common law.
Courts and commentators often presume that the primary substan-
tive provisions of federal employment discrimination statutes were
adopted against the backdrop of common-law torts.' This Article chal-
lenges this core assumption and also explains why identifying a cause of
action as a tort in some general sense does not provide any meaningful
basis for courts to apply proximate cause to it. This Article demonstrates
the dangers of importing common-law principles into discrimination law,
using the lens of proximate cause and the core federal civil rights statute,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 This discussion intersects with
concerns about the tortification of discrimination law.
The Article discusses how only weak textual, intent, or purpose-
based arguments support courts' use of proximate cause in Title VII. Ti-
tle VII is a complex statute in which Congress expressed ideas about lim-
1. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). The statement in Staub is arguably dic-
ta; however, as this Article demonstrates, unsupported statements in one Supreme Court case often
are extrapolated and extended in later cases.
2. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982);
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 45, 67-68 (1999); Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV.
383 (1908).
3. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191 ("[W]e start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal
tort it adopts the background of general tort law."); see also Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-
Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and
the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 196-97 (1993) (discussing sources support-
ing view that Title VII is a tort). This Article does not claim that there is no connection between torts
and statutory employment discrimination law. Rather, it challenges the claim that the statutes' prima-
ry substantive provisions are generally drawn from tort law.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006) (Title VII). Although the Article primarily uses Title
VII examples, it also considers other major federal discrimination statutes such as the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (2000) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (ADA). Where relevant dif-
ferences exist between these statutes and Title VII, they are indicated in either the text or footnotes.
The Article does not consider proximate cause in the retaliation or failure to accommodate context,
although many of the issues would be similar. It is not making arguments about the role of proximate
cause in cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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iting liability throughout the statutory regime. Title VII defines the
plaintiffs who may sue, limits the defendants who are prohibited from
discriminating, and identifies the kinds of acts for which liability can be
imposed.' It also contains time limits for filing suit, affirmative defenses,
and burdens of production and persuasion that further limit the statute's
reach.6 These expressions eliminate, or at least severely constrain, the
space available for courts to import and define proximate cause. Given
these limits, the substantive discrimination provisions, unlike tort law, do
not need proximate cause to buttress factual cause.
More importantly, Title VII differs significantly from common-law
torts, like negligence, where courts commonly apply proximate cause.
Proximate cause has no independent descriptive power and is highly de-
pendent on the underlying tort to which it is attached.' Employment dis-
crimination claims do not fit within any traditional tort and therefore do
not align well with traditional articulations of proximate cause.
The Article demonstrates the theoretical and practical difficulties of
importing proximate cause principles into employment discrimination
law. The notoriously flexible and inconsistent theoretical underpinnings
of proximate cause make it likely that courts purporting to import prox-
imate cause will actually be making relatively unguided policy decisions.
They will use the broad idea of proximate cause as a framework for dis-
cussion, selectively quoting available sources to reach a particular out-
come. The Article demonstrates why this approach is especially prob-
lematic in the federal employment discrimination context and argues that
Title VII already addresses liability limits.
How the courts resolve this question is important for several rea-
sons. First, importing proximate cause principles into employment dis-
crimination law will further limit the reach of federal discrimination law,
in line with already conservative interpretations of factual causation.,
Second, the lower courts will be able to use proximate cause principles to
inappropriately grant summary judgment in favor of employers.9 Third,
using proximate cause in discrimination statutes will create confusion in
an already complicated area.'0 Fourth, if courts enshrine proximate cause
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009) (holding ADEA plaintiffs
must establish but-for causation).
9. Even though proximate cause is a question of fact, the fear is that courts will transform it into
a legal inquiry by finding that there is no question for a jury to resolve. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 981
(2012).
10. Cook v. IPC Int'l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that the district court judge
in a cat's paw case instructed jury incorrectly because of "vague judicial terminology, such as 'motivat-
ing factor' and 'proximate cause' (the latter has been a part of the judicial vocabulary for the last 150
years, yet its meaning has never become clear)" that "confuses judges, jurors, and lawyers alike" (cita-
tions omitted)).
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as an element of a federal discrimination claim, defendants will not be
held liable for some acts, even if those acts are taken because of a pro-
tected trait. Finally, how the courts approach this issue may serve as a
roadmap for the courts to import even more common-law principles into
employment law.
Part I lays the analytical groundwork for this discussion by describ-
ing the Supreme Court's decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital and by
identifying the traditional rationales for applying proximate cause. Part
II describes key features of federal employment discrimination law and
shows how Title VII already limits liability. Part III demonstrates how
courts are likely to use weak claims to import proximate cause into em-
ployment law. It also frames statutory interpretation as an expression of
courts' beliefs about separation of powers. Part IV demonstrates how
federal employment discrimination statutes do not map well onto the
traditional torts in which proximate cause analysis developed and rejects
other fundamental arguments used to import proximate cause. It also
describes practical and theoretical problems with using proximate cause
in the employment discrimination context. Part V shows why proximate
cause is not necessary in discrimination cases and provides a framework
for future analysis.
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND THE CAT'S PAW
To understand the dangers of importing proximate cause into em-
ployment discrimination law, it is necessary to understand proximate
cause generally and how the Supreme Court strongly hinted that this
concept should apply to Title VII.
A. Staub v. Proctor Hospital
In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Supreme Court considered wheth-
er cat's paw cases are cognizable under the Uniformed Services Em-
ployment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)." USERRA pro-
hibits an employer from terminating an individual, if the individual's
military service is a motivating factor in the decision.12
A cat's paw case is one in which a biased individual takes an action
against another person based on a protected trait, but an unbiased indi-
vidual ultimately makes the challenged employment decision." For ex-
ample, a biased supervisor could place a bad evaluation in an employee's
11. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189-90 (2011). For a comprehensive discussion of Staub, see Charles A.
Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012).
12. 38 U.S.C. H 4311(a), (c) (2006).
13. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1190. The term cat's paw refers to a fable in which a monkey con-
vinces a cat to pull chestnuts from a fire. The cat burns its paws trying to obtain the chestnuts and the
monkey eats all of the chestnuts. Id. at 1190 n.1.
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file, and a second supervisor (not knowing about the bias of the first su-
pervisor) would then decide to terminate the employee in a reduction in
force based on the bad evaluation. In Staub, the plaintiff alleged that
two supervisors were hostile to his military obligations and falsely re-
ported he violated company rules. 4 The vice president of human re-
sources then made the decision to terminate Staub based on the rule vio-
lations."
The primary question in Staub was whether the employer could be
held liable for violating USERRA when the final decision maker did not
consider the plaintiff's military service when making the decision to ter-
minate the plaintiff's employment.'" The Court approved the use of a
cat's paw theory, at least in a limited set of circumstances. The Court
held that "if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary ani-
mus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment
action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment
action, then the employer is liable under USERRA." 7
With this sentence, the Supreme Court imports proximate cause in-
to cat's paw analysis and potentially into employment discrimination
more broadly. Courts are likely to apply the case's reasoning outside of
the USERRA context, because the Staub decision emphasizes the simi-
larities between USERRA and Title VII.'1
There are several important facets of Staub. First, the Court states
that "when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of
general tort law." 9 There is no meaningful discussion, however, of
whether employment discrimination statutes generally are torts or
whether USERRA in particular is a tort. Second, the Court does not
discuss why it uses proximate cause language, nor does it define what it
means by proximate cause. Third, Staub makes proximate cause an ele-
ment of a claim. Thus, the proximate cause question is not whether a
particular type of damage is proximately caused by conduct, but whether
the conduct in question creates any liability.z0
Importantly, it appears that the Court reaches for proximate cause
14. Id. at 1189.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1189,1191.
17. Id. at 1194 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
18. Id. at 1191. The proximate cause language in Staub is arguably dicta, because the case's core
issue relates to factual cause. As discussed later in this Article, however, dicta in one employment dis-
crimination case often has far-reaching consequences in later decisions.
19. Id. at 1191.
20. When this Article discusses proximate cause, it makes a distinction between proximate cause
as an element of the cause of action and proximate cause as a damages concept. In negligence cases,
these concepts are blurred because damages are an element of the cause of action. In discrimination
cases, however, the harm is the unequal treatment based on a protected trait, which may result in vary-
ing kinds of damages. This Article is discussing proximate cause in the context of whether liability for
differential treatment exists.
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because it is concerned that it might be unfair to hold employers liable in
all instances when biased conduct somehow factually causes an employ-
ment decision. 21 This Article demonstrates why proximate cause is not a
good theoretical fit with employment discrimination statutes and why it
is not necessary to limit liability.
B. Proximate Cause
At common law, causation often embraces two different kinds of is-
sues: cause in fact and legal or proximate cause. 22 "Conduct is a factual
cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the con-
duct."23 In some tort cases, such as negligence cases, factual cause is a
necessary, but not sufficient, basis for imposing liability on a defendant
for harm.24 In these cases, courts impose a requirement of legal cause,
also called proximate cause.
Four attributes of proximate cause are important for purposes of
statutory analysis. First, courts have not arrived at a consistent concern
or set of concerns that underlie it. Second, proximate cause inherently
relates to policy decisions about where liability should end. While courts
express proximate cause in different ways, every iteration serves a liabil-
ity-limiting function in that it further defines the scope of prohibited
conduct in cases where an actor can be described as factually causing an
event. Proximate cause expresses a normative preference about where
the line should be drawn. Third, the goals of proximate cause have
evolved over time and are still evolving. Finally, courts vary the use of
proximate cause in tort cases, depending on whether the underlying tort
is intentional. Together, these four attributes make it difficult to apply
proximate cause to statutes.
Defining proximate cause is notoriously tricky.25 Leading torts
commentators indicate that "[t]here is perhaps nothing in the entire field
of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which the
opinions are in such a welter of confusion." 26 Considered broadly, prox-
imate cause is essentially concerned with problems regarding intervening
actions, a foreseeable plaintiff, the scope of risk of the defendant's ac-
21. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193.
22. The distinction between these two concepts is often blurred. Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause:
Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REv. 941, 945 (2001).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (2010)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)l.
24. See id. § 29.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th ed. 2009) (providing multiple definitions for proximate
cause and indicating that the following terms also reflect proximate cause: direct cause, efficient cause,
legal cause, procuring cause, and remote cause, among others); Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in
Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51 (1991). Further,
the definition of proximate cause has changed over time. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 29.
26. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
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tions, and/or policy concerns.27 While it is possible to describe these con-
cerns separately, in some cases, two or more concerns overlap.
Some courts use proximate cause to determine whether some inter-
vening action cuts off the original actor's liability.28 In thinking about su-
perseding cause, the court is often determining that the acts of a third
party interrupt the sequence of conduct, consequence, and injury be-
tween the defendant and plaintiff such that liability of the defendant is
no longer appropriate. 29
At times proximate cause is concerned with reasonably anticipated
consequences or the slightly different, but often related, question of
whether the harm caused was within the scope of risk of the defendant's
conduct.3 0 Some courts have identified proximate cause as considering
whether the plaintiff was foreseeable.3' Each of these iterations is hope-
lessly tied up in goals and policies related to the underlying cause of ac-
tion, because none of them can be defined irrespective of them.3 2 Proxi-
mate cause is defined against the backdrop of the surrounding tort
elements, especially factual cause, and has no independent descriptive
power.33
In some iterations, courts do not express a specific goal for proxi-
mate cause, but rather, describe it generally as being concerned with line
drawing-determining when as a matter of policy a defendant should not
be liable, even though the defendant's actions caused the injury in ques-
tion." Importantly, five members of the Supreme Court have recently
27. This Section details the major components of proximate cause as they have been expressed
both in tort cases and in the Restatement. The Restatement has recently started to use the words "scope
of liability" to refer to proximate cause and has also focused the inquiry on the scope of risk.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD),supra note 23, ch. 6, special note on proximate cause. Using Restatement sec-
tions applicable to physical harm cases may not be appropriate in statutes where the harms are emo-
tional or economic in nature. Reference to these sections is only meant to explain the possible scope
of proximate cause. This Section omits the direct test that is found in early common-law cases because
of its waning relevance to modern proximate cause inquiries. See id. § 29 cmt. b ("[C]onduct need not
be close in space or time to the plaintiffs harm to be a proximate cause."); Kelley, supra note 25, at 52.
Some courts still rely on arguments about directness when discussing proximate cause. See, e.g., CSX
Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2645 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
28. The term "superseding cause" is often used to refer to an intervening force that is sufficient
to cut off liability from the original tortfeasor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 34 cmt. b.
29. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 TEx. L. REV. 917, 970
(2010).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 29 ("An actor's liability is limited to those harms
that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious."); Robert L. Fischman, The Divides
of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 688
(2008); Kelley, supra note 25, at 92. The Restatement explains the risk test is "congruent" with the
foreseeability test, if the latter test is "properly understood and framed." RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 23, § 29 cmt. e.
31. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 29 cmt. f (discussing Palsgraf).
32. KEETON ET AL.,supra note 26, at 274.
33. See id. at 273.
34. Stapleton, supra note 22, at 985-86 (listing the following concerns that might be involved in
proximate cause line drawing: "(1) the perceived purpose of the recognition of a pocket of obligation
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embraced this line-drawing function of proximate cause.35 In a recent
case, the Court explained that the term "proximate cause" is "shorthand
for a concept: Injuries have countless causes, and not all should give rise
to legal liability."36 It then quoted the dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co., which noted that "because of convenience, of public policy,
of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point.""
The Supreme Court has referred to proximate cause as a generic la-
bel the courts use to describe "the judicial tools used to limit a person's
responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts."38 It also
has quoted a noted torts treatise referring to proximate cause as reflect-
ing ideas of "what is administratively possible and convenient."39 In this
iteration, it appears the Court is more concerned about proof issues. For
example, if an injury is less direct, it is more difficult to determine how
much of the plaintiff's damages can be traced to the violation (a factual
causation issue) and whether the courts would need to engage in com-
plex decisions regarding damages.40
The Supreme Court has recently bemoaned the lack of consensus
regarding proximate cause definitions, noting that common-law formula-
tions include, among others, "the immediate or nearest antecedent test;
the efficient, producing cause test; the substantial factor test; and the
probable, or natural and probable, or foreseeable consequence test.""
Members of the Court cannot agree on what exactly proximate cause is
designed to accomplish. 42  Recently, Justices have adopted the line-
drawing account of proximate cause, and four members of the Court
have stated that proximate cause relates to whether there is "some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,"
whether the injuries are "too remote, purely contingent or indirect," and
whether the connection between the wrong and the injury is so "tenu-
ous ... that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity." 43
in the circumstances; (2) the costs of legal rules and their administration; (3) the dignity of the law; (4)
the interest in individual freedom; (5) the recklessness or intention to harm, if any, of the defendant;
(6) the relative wrongfulness of different actors; (7) the concern that the extent of liability not be whol-
ly out of proportion to the degree of wrongfulness; (8) the fact that the defendant was acting in pursuit
of commercial profit; (9) whether allowance of recovery for such consequences would be likely to
open the way to fraudulent claims").
35. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630,2637 (2011).
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dis-
senting)).
38. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
39. Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, at 264).
40. Id. at 269. While courts use proximate cause terminology in these instances, these questions
are often actually issues relating to cause in fact or allocation of fault.
41. CSX, 131 S. Ct. at 2642 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. For another description of proximate cause, see Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S.
451, 469-70 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. CSX, 131 S. Ct. at 2645-46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks
[Vol. 20138
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As demonstrated in the famous Palsgraf case, there is no clear line
separating one rationale from another, and court opinions regarding
proximate cause are typically difficult to reduce to a consistent line of
reasoning." At least one commentator has asserted that proximate cause
has no inherent meaning, but substitutes for other elements of a cause of
action when the decision on that element is difficult. 45 Importantly, the
meaning of proximate cause is dependent on the surrounding elements of
the underlying tort. 46
Recently, Chief Justice Roberts has suggested that a lack of fixed
meaning for proximate cause is not problematic.47 Rather, proximate
cause is not meant to provide a "mechanical or uniform test," but fur-
nishes "'illustrations of situations which judicious men upon careful con-
sideration have adjudged to be on one side of the line or the other."' 48
While the Chief Justice is correct that proximate cause concerns liability
limits, the rationales used to both justify the limit and to decide where
the line is drawn are significant. Different rationales may lead the courts
to different results.
Importantly, the courts' and commentators' understanding of prox-
imate cause has changed over time and not necessarily in a straight tra-
jectory toward a more reasoned approach.49 Early iterations of proxi-
mate cause that required the event to be the nearest in time or space
have largely been rejected in recent iterations.', The Restatement (First)
of Torts embraced an idea of legal cause that included concepts from fac-
tual cause and proximate cause analysis, while the Restatement (Third) of
Torts separates factual and proximate cause." These changes over time
are important because they make it difficult for courts to borrow proxi-
mate cause ideas from one time period and apply them to another. In
such instances, the courts may be using the term "proximate cause" to
mean different concepts.
Not only does proximate cause have evolving, contested underpin-
nings and goals, common-law courts also apply it differently, depending
omitted).
44. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Indeed, even in Palsgraf,
Judge Cardozo addressed concerns about causation as it relates to duty. Id. at 99-100.
45. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REV. 471, 471-72 (1950).
46. See id.
47. CSX, 131 S. Ct. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, at 276-79.
50. Id. at 276.
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 26 cmt. a; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 430
(1934) (indicating that to establish legal cause the plaintiff must be in the class of persons to which the
defendant's actions create a risk of causing harm); id. § 431 (defining legal cause as being a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm, without an exception to relieve the defendant of responsibility); id.
§ 433 (defining legal cause with concepts such as whether there was a continuous force or series of
forces and whether the harm was highly extraordinary given the defendant's conduct).
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on the nature of the underlying tort.5 2 The Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm notes that when an actor in-
tentionally causes harm it is liable, even if the harm was unlikely to occur
and that intentional actors are liable for a broader range of harms than
negligent actors." In deciding the scope of liability, the Restatement
(Third) notes that the following factors play important roles in the analy-
sis: "the moral culpability of the actor, . .. the seriousness of harm in-
tended and threatened by those acts, and the degree to which the actor's
conduct deviated from appropriate care.""
Proximate cause rarely plays a decisive role in intentional tort cas-
es." There are many reasons for this. In intentional tort cases "the de-
fendant's wrongful conduct is [usually] closely linked-temporally and
conceptually-to the plaintiff's harm."" Few intentional tort cases in-
volve multiple causation. Conduct intended to cause harm is consid-
ered more blameworthy, and courts have had fewer qualms about the
scope of liability. Thus, the necessity and strength of proximate cause
doctrine severely diminishes in the intentional tort context. When prox-
imate cause is relevant in intentional tort cases, proximate cause analysis
may cut off liability for the defendant in fewer circumstances than it
would when applied to negligence.5 9
As this Section demonstrates, the underlying goals of proximate
cause are multiple, contested, and evolving. The use of proximate cause
varies across tort actions, and many of proximate cause's underlying con-
cerns relate to policy. Each of these attributes of proximate cause is cen-
tral to the question of whether it should be imported into discrimination
law.
52. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 437 (2004).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 33. Some question whether traditional notions of
proximate cause work well in non-traditional common-law tort cases. Stapleton, supra note 22, at 946.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 33. The Restatement view is even more nuanced,
noting that where intent is established by showing that the defendant was substantially certain, proxi-
mate cause should not be as narrow as it is with other intent cases. Id. § 33 cmt. d.
55. Id. § 33 cmt. e (noting the "paucity" of legal opinions discussing proximate cause in inten-
tional tort cases).
56. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV.
811, 832 (2009).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 832-33.
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 33 ("An actor who intentionally or recklessly caus-
es harm is subject to liability for a broader range of harms than the harms for which that actor would
be liable if only acting negligently."); id. § 33 cmt. a (noting that its scope of risk standard is inade-
quate with respect to intentional torts); 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 421 (2004) (noting that proxi-
mate cause applies in strict liability). But see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Parens Patriae
Litigation to Redress Societal Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The Latest Stage in the Evolution of
Crimtorts, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 45, 68 (2011) (asserting that courts do not typically apply
proximate cause to strict liability).
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II. TITLE VII AND ITS LIABILITY LIMITS
The major federal employment discrimination statutes differ in a
fundamental way from the common law from which proximate cause de-
rives. Proximate cause is typically associated with common-law negli-
gence claims, which have two core features. First, judges created com-
mon-law negligence.6? Second, negligence law only broadly defines its
contours and does not specifically define the parties and the conduct to
which it applies.6 1 Thus, negligence is expressed in general terms such as
breach, causation, and duty. In general, a person or entity owes duties to
the world.62
This Part explores how the employment discrimination statutes are
radically different. They not only explicitly provide for a liability stan-
dard, but also come packaged with a complex web of other limiting prin-
ciples.63 This Part explores key features of these statutory regimes that
are important for purposes of proximate cause: the different "types" of
discrimination cases, the causal language, the definitions of potential par-
ties and discriminatory conduct, the deadlines for filing suit, court-
created agency principles, and the damages provisions.
These attributes of federal employment discrimination law repre-
sent both explicit and implicit choices about the core concerns of proxi-
mate cause, limiting the courts' power to make contrary judgments. Im-
portantly, if the courts import proximate cause into discrimination law,
these limits suggest that the proximate cause applied to the statute would
not be coterminous with the common law.
A. The Different "Types" of Discrimination Cases
There are three major federal employment discrimination statutes:
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act." The courts have developed complex
terminology and frameworks to describe the types of facts that can estab-
lish liability under the federal employment discrimination statutes.65 This
60. 57A AM. JUR 2D Negligence § 2 (2004).
61. Id. § 6.
62. At times, either by common law or statutes, certain types of potential defendants are ex-
empted from liability: however, the modem trend is to reduce the available exemptions. Victor E.
Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions to Protect Others: Surgical In-
struments, Not Machetes, Are Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 12 (2005) (discussing how charitable
immunity waned in the twentieth century).
63. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 27 (1994) (discussing
compromises made to pass Title VII).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. H§ 621-634 (2000) (ADEA); 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (ADA). When this Article refers to the ADA, it is only
referring to those portions dealing with employment discrimination.
65. The author is largely skeptical of these types and frameworks, but they are helpful for de-
scribing the current state of employment discrimination law. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking
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inquiry often involves two steps, with the courts first placing the conduct
within a certain theory of liability and then analyzing the claim through
various proof structures. 66
Originally, all of the different "types" of discrimination were de-
rived from the primary operative language of Title VII, which is consid-
ered to be the cornerstone federal discrimination statute. 67 Title VII pro-
vides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'
Although not identical, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) have similarly
broad operative language. 69 None of the statutes explicitly reference
proximate cause.
Courts often divide discrimination law into two separate ideas:
intentional discrimination and disparate impact. 0 The courts have
further subdivided intentional discrimination cases by describing
them as either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence cases. Cases
that involve explicitly discriminatory policies or conduct are called di-
rect evidence cases and are analyzed under a fairly simple formula-
tion, requiring a plaintiff to establish that a decision was taken be-
cause of a protected trait." Plaintiffs who do not have direct evidence
Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69 (2011).
66. See generally id. (describing the development of various frameworks).
67. See id. at 73.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (ADEA). The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 2009). It then further defines discrimina-
tion in a separate subsection, containing seven separate definitional sections. Id. § 12112(b). It is
plausible that the ADA's multiple provisions have different causal implications. The causal questions
related to the ADA have only been marginally considered by the courts and will not be a focus for this
Article.
70. See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009) ("Few propositions
are less controversial or more embedded in the structure of Title VII analysis than that the statute
recognizes only 'disparate treatment' and 'disparate impact' theories of employment discrimination."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
71. See, e.g., Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2000) (indicating that a
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and who allege that improper consideration of a protected trait was
the cause of their harm often proceed through the three-part
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, 72 which is described
in more detail in the next Section.
Courts also organize Title VII cases by categorizing them as ei-
ther single-motive cases or mixed-motive cases. Single-motive cases
often are analyzed under the frameworks described in the prior para-
graph and are often cases of competing narratives between the plain-
tiff's and the employer's reason for the job-related action. Title VII
mixed-motive cases, which involve claims that both legitimate and
discriminatory reasons caused an action, are analyzed using the statu-
tory language added in the 1991 amendments. 73
Other subsets of intentional discrimination are harassment and pat-
tern or practice cases. Harassment cases are analyzed under a multiple-
part framework developed by the courts.74 The plaintiff must prove the
harassment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."7  Pattern or practices cases usually involve claims by numerous
individuals that the defendant had an actual policy of discrimination or
that its conduct demonstrated that discrimination was the norm.7 1
Outside of the intentional discrimination context, plaintiffs can pro-
ceed on disparate impact claims. Disparate impact occurs when a specif-
ic employment practice creates a disproportionate impact on a protected
group unless the defendant can prove an affirmative defense, which dif-
fers by statutory regime." Under Title VII, the defendant can prevail if it
can demonstrate that the practice is job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.78  Under the ADEA, the defendant can prevail if it
demonstrates that the practice was based on a reasonable factor other
than age. 9
To date, the courts have not embraced negligent discrimination as a
company policy of discrimination constitutes direct evidence). Outside of the context of facially dis-
criminatory policies, the courts have had difficulty defining what constitutes direct evidence, and its
definitions vary. Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2008); Vaughn v. Epworth
Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2008); Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002)
(per curiam).
72. See, e.g., Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011). This is not always the case.
See, e.g., Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep't, 578 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009) (allowing a plaintiff to
make a case of discrimination without resorting to McDonnell Douglas, if the plaintiff has "either di-
rect or circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of intentional discrimination"); Taylor v.
Peerless Indus. Inc., 322 F. App'x. 355, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying a modified McDonnell Doug-
las framework). It is questionable whether the divide between direct and circumstantial evidence
should continue to exist after Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (holding direct evi-
dence is not required to obtain mixed-motive instruction). Nonetheless, courts continue to make the
distinction.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The Supreme Court has held that but-for cause is required under
the ADEA. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). This question has not been defin-
itively resolved in the ADA context.
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basis for liability.? Further, the courts have not interpreted the federal
discrimination statutes as allowing for claims of unconscious bias, to fully
remedy pregnancy discrimination, or to fully account for structural dis-
crimination." Unconscious bias claims rely on research that suggests that
many people harbor bias that is not explicitly part of their recognized de-
cision-making process. Structural discrimination posits that discrimina-
tion is not always the result of an identifiable bad actor or formal policy,
but rather "[iut often takes form in a fluid process of social interaction,
perception, evaluation, and disbursement of opportunity." 3
The current construction of the statutes limits the necessity of ap-
plying proximate cause principles because the types of conduct that will
result in liability are narrowly circumscribed. Unless the alleged conduct
satisfies the analytical framework for a particular theory of discrimina-
tion, the courts will not impose liability. Interestingly, it is unclear how
cat's paw cases fit into the current analytical structures.
74. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). A plaintiff can also prevail in a disparate impact case under
Title VII, if it can demonstrate that the employer could have used less discriminatory alternate prac-
tices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). This option is not available under the ADEA. Smith v. City
of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228,243 (2005).
79. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 93 (2008).
80. See, e.g., Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 3:08 CV 1471, 2009 WL 803586, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 25, 2009) ("He also alleges Defendant was merely 'negligent' in its hiring practices, which
does not rise to the standard of intentional discrimination required by Title VII."); Jalal v. Columbia
Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Title VII, however, provides no remedy for negligent
discrimination .... ). See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (setting forth a theory of negligent discrimination). It should be noted that
courts do recognize employer liability for negligence where the employer has failed to take action to
prevent or correct harassment; however, that liability depends on there first being a showing of har-
assment. See, e.g., Zarazed v. Spar Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A 05-2621, 2006 WL 224050, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 27, 2006). Further, the third step in the Title VII disparate impact analysis arguably relies on a
negligence standard. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). For an interesting discussion of how Title VII
arguably does encompass a negligence standard, see Zatz, supra note 70.
81. Sperino, supra note 65, at 85. For an excellent account of the limits of pregnancy discrimina-
tion protections, see Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98
GEO. L.J. 567 (2010). Discrimination law also does not fully address the ways that workers are re-
quired to perform identity work. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1259 (2000).
82. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV.
741, 746 (2005); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-25 (1987).
83. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91 (2003).
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B. Factual Cause Language
The factual cause standards in employment discrimination law also
play an important role in limiting liability.' This Section highlights that
liability-limiting role, as well as three other features of factual cause that
are important in this context. First, many of the factual cause standards
do not mimic traditional tort articulations of these concepts, either in the
actual statutory language or court interpretations of such language.8*
Second, even when tort-like language is used, the factual cause standard
is proved in ways that are unlike tort law, and the factual cause standards
are intertwined with underlying judgments about the likelihood of dis-
crimination and who should be responsible for certain conduct. Finally,
employment discrimination statutes often provide bracketed liability,
prohibiting certain conduct, but also indicating the circumstances under
which an employer will not be liable for harm that might otherwise be
categorized as discriminatory.
The development of causal standards under the federal discrimina-
tion statutes has been fraught with controversy, and the standards con-
tinue to evolve." Without making any normative assertions, it is possible
to describe the current state of the law and the places where the law is
likely to develop. The courts initially considered causation questions by
interpreting Title VII. Three separate causal strands are important: the
development of the McDonnell Douglas test, so-called mixed-motive
analysis, and disparate impact analysis.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court created
a three-part, burden-shifting test for analyzing individual disparate
treatment cases.' Under McDonnell Douglas, a court first evaluates the
84. Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235,
1244-45 (1988) (discussing how factual cause is a liability-limiting principle).
85. See id. at 1248-49 (discussing traditional common law concepts of but-for causation and sub-
stantial factor).
86. See id. at 1259 (discussing early cases using but-for causation). This Article does not intend
to describe all of the factual cause standards that arise in discrimination law. That subject is worth
several law review articles and has been widely discussed. See, e.g., id. at 1240; Michael C. Harper, The
Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unful-
filled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 75 (2010) (discussing historical de-
velopment of causation in disparate treatment cases); Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of
Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 500-11 (2006);
Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 911, 929 (2005); Zatz, supra note 70, at 1374-76 (discussing causation in disparate treatment cas-
es).
87. It is not clear whether in some of the original cases interpreting Title VII's main operative
provisions, the Supreme Court was concerned with causation questions. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The
cases have, however, subsequently been considered to have causation implications.
88. 411 U.S. at 802, 804. Some circuits will allow a plaintiff to make a case of discrimination
without resorting to McDonnell Douglas, if the plaintiff has "either direct or circumstantial evidence
that supports an inference of intentional discrimination." Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep't, 578
F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
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prima facie case, which requires proof that "(i) [the plaintiff] belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications." 9 If the prima facie case is proven, a rebut-
table presumption of discrimination arises. 90 The burden of production
then shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the employee's rejection."9t If the defendant meets this
requirement, the plaintiff can still prevail by demonstrating that the de-
fendant's reason for the rejection was simply pretext. 92
Even though the factual cause standard in discrimination cases is
not sole causation, courts often treat the McDonnell Douglas test as if it
focuses on the employer's non-discriminatory reason for its action.
McDonnell Douglas is sometimes characterized as incorporating but-for
cause. 93  However, McDonnell Douglas also contains an overlooked
causal standard. Under the test, it is possible for the plaintiff to prevail if
he or she establishes the prima facie case, and the defendant is unable to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision.94 The
prima facie case does not require the plaintiff to establish but for causa-
tion, but only to prove certain facts that the courts have determined are
sufficient to suggest discrimination might be at work.95 Within the prima
facie case is an important presumption, that discrimination is a common
facet of employment. 96 Traditional common-law articulations of cause do
not mimic the three-part, burden-shifting structure of McDonnell Doug-
las, and the test is not drawn from common-law sources."
Cases that proceed under this framework are usually cases of com-
89. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The factors considered in the prima facie case may
vary depending on the factual scenario presented in the case. Id. at 802 n.13. The problem with reli-
ance on comparator evidence is well argued in Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison,
120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011).
90. Harper, supra note 86, at 76.
91. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
92. Id. at 804; Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981). In St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, the Court considered whether the factfinder's rejection of the employer's as-
serted reason for its action mandated a finding for the plaintiff. 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). The Su-
preme Court held that while the factfinder's rejection of the employer's proffered reason permits the
factfinder to infer discrimination, it does not compel such a finding. Id. at 510-11. Courts continue to
use the McDonnell Douglas test to analyze claims under the ADEA, but the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed whether the test applies to the ADEA. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).
93. Belton, supra note 84, at 1240. But see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 n.6
(1989) (explaining how references to but-for causation in pretext cases only suggested that if plaintiff
proved such causation she would prevail, not that but-for cause is required to be proven to prevail).
94. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
95. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-42.
96. Sullivan, supra note 86, at 929.
97. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-07.
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peting narratives, in which the plaintiff is advocating that an action or set
of actions was taken because of a protected trait and the employer is as-
serting that this is not the case.98 In practice, McDonnell Douglas causes
courts to focus on narrow visions of how discrimination happens and
therefore makes it unlikely that a plaintiff trying to prevail on a strange
scenario will survive the test.
McDonnell Douglas focuses on the plaintiff's alleged reason for
conduct versus the defendant's articulation of a legitimate reason for its
decision. Given the test's focus on competing narratives, it was unclear
whether a plaintiff could prevail if she alleged both legitimate and dis-
criminatory reasons played a role in an employment decision and wheth-
er the defendant could escape liability if it proved a legitimate reason
partly motivated the decision.9 9 In the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII as allowing so called
"mixed-motive" claims and created a test for evaluating such claims.o
The Supreme Court plurality opinion did not purport to draw its test
from traditional common-law causation principles, and it specifically in-
dicated that to equate the causal standard in Title VII as requiring "but-
for" cause is to misunderstand it.o'0 Indeed, it is clear that the plurality
opinion tried to balance several objectives unique to employment law:
the idea that employment decisions should be based on merit and the
idea that employers retain certain prerogatives to make decisions.10
Unhappy with the Price Waterhouse test, Congress amended Title
VII in 1991 and made it easier for plaintiffs to establish liability.03 Con-
gress indicated that a plaintiff could prevail on a discrimination claim
98. See, e.g., id. at 796.
99. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232, 237.
100. Id. at 241-43. The employer has the ability to avoid liability by proving an affirmative de-
fense-that it would have made the same decision, even if it had not allowed the protected trait to play
a role. Id. at 244-45.
101. Id. at 240-49. But see id. at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that statute requires
but-for causation and characterizing the burden shift as being like burden shifts in tort cases). The
affirmative defense is drawn from a First Amendment case. Id. at 248-49 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)).
102. Id. at 242, 243-44; see also id. at 263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that dissent's call
for a but-for causation standard was not inconsistent with plurality opinion, considering tort concepts
of burden shifting).
103. See, e.g., Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This provision is referred to as a
mixed-motive provision for ease of identification. There is significant debate regarding whether this
provision should be limited to the mixed-motive context. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect
of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83 (2004);
William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOus. L. REV. 1549 (2005);
William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 199 (2003); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise
of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 76 (2003). See generally Michael J. Zim-
mer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53
EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004) (arguing that the new approach established in the 1991 amendments to Title
VII will apply to most individual discrimination cases).
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under Title VII by establishing that a protected trait played a motivating
factor in an employment decision." Congress relied on the affirmative
defense created in Price Waterhouse, but indicated that it would be a par-
tial defense to damages, rather than a complete bar to recovery.' The
employer must establish that it would have made the same decision ab-
sent consideration of the protected trait.'" In other words, if a protected
trait played a role in the decision, the employer can still reduce the dam-
ages for which it is liable, if it can show that use of the protected trait was
not necessary to causing its ultimate decision.'" This two-tiered factual
cause standard does not mimic traditional tort cause standards, especially
given that if the employer prevails on the second step, the employer wins
only a partial defense to damages.'"
Strangely, the Supreme Court, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc., has interpreted the ADEA as requiring a plaintiff to establish but-
for cause.'" This standard also departs from traditional common law,
however, which allows plaintiffs to use alternate causal standards, such as
showing an action was a substantial factor in causing harm."o The Staub
decision, in which the Supreme Court used proximate cause in the con-
text of USERRA, is in tension with Gross, as Staub appears to embrace
common-law proximate cause concepts, while Gross rejects applying the
full breadth of common-law factual cause concepts.
It also is difficult to map these statutory factual cause standards on-
to tort causal standards because in disparate treatment cases the causal
inquiry is intertwined with language of intent. Although there is a strong
argument that plaintiffs should not be required to prove intent in dis-
crimination cases, courts often characterize individual disparate treat-
ment cases as requiring intent."' This issue is further confused because
courts have not clarified what intent means and whether it is synonymous
with the common-law meaning of the term."2 The courts have never
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). Although the courts have not clarified the exact meaning of
"motivating factor," at least one commentator refers to it as requiring miniminal causation. Katz, su-
pra note 86, at 505-06. It is not clear how the 1991 amendments interact with the McDonnell Douglas
test. Harper, supra note 86, at 93. See generally Zimmer, supra note 103 (discussing the 1991 amend-
ments and how they relate to McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). When Congress added the motivating factor language to Title VII,
it did not make similar changes to the ADEA or ADA. Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Dis-
crimination Law Through the Lens ofJury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 289,318 (2010).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
107. See Katz, supra note 86, at 502.
108. See Belton, supra note 84, at 1277.
109. 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
110. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
111. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2010); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577
(2009).
112. D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on
Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 735-37 (1987) (distinguishing motive from intent
and concluding that Title VII should use motive). Further, the meaning of intent is less clear after
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
[Vol. 201318
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
carefully articulated how the causal standards interact with the intent re-
quirement. And it is difficult to separate intent from causation as the
statutory words "because of," which are used to discuss causation, are al-
so used to explain intent.1 '
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether Title VII's primary operative language only recognized inten-
tional discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court held that
Title VII not only prohibited intentional discrimination, but also policies
and practices that created "built-in headwinds" to the hiring of employ-
ees that correlated with a protected trait.114 In Griggs, the Court articu-
lated a reason for recognizing a category of discrimination called dispar-
ate impact and began to provide a rudimentary structure for evaluating
it. 15
Subsequent cases created a fuller structure for evaluating disparate
impact cases under Title VII."6 Unhappy with this structure, Congress
amended Title VII in 1991 to add a proof standard for disparate impact
cases."7  A complaining party can establish disparate impact by demon-
strating that "a respondent uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact" on the basis of a protected trait and "the re-
spondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity."1 t 8
The plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that the employer refuses
to adopt a less discriminatory alternate employment practice.119
In the Title VII disparate impact context, factual causation is multi-
tiered.12 0 In the first step, the plaintiff must demonstrate a certain out-
come (a statistically disproportionate outcome), something doing the
causing (a specific employment practice), and a causal connection be-
1, 7 (2011) (arguing the case moves away from an animus-based notion).
113. Rich, supra note 112, at 45-47. Teasing out the underlying meaning of courts, it appears they
require an actor to take some action that is later judged to be motivated by the use of a protected trait
and that this action caused certain outcomes. Zatz, supra note 70, at 1374-76 (discussing causation in
disparate treatment cases). There are strong arguments that discrimination should not be concerned
with narrow concepts of motivation, intent, or causation. See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The
Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 17, 94-97 (1991). Factual cause questions may play varying roles in cases, depending on the
underlying claim. In pattern or practice cases, the causal requirement plays diminished significance,
because the plaintiff is required to demonstrate that discrimination was the standard operating proce-
dure of the company. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,358 (1977).
114. 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
115. Id. at 431.
116. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975).
117. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 570.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
119. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
120. For an excellent discussion of disparate impact causation under Title VII, see Ramona L.
Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model Through New
Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325 (1996).
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tween the two.121 The exact causal connection has not been defined,'122
although there is support for the idea that disparate impact requires
something more or different than traditional but-for causation.123 Even if
the defendant is able to establish its affirmative defense, Title VII still al-
lows a plaintiff to prevail on the third step in the inquiry under an analy-
sis that appears similar to a negligence standard; however, this standard
can only be applied after the first two steps of the disparate impact in-
quiry are completed.124
Further, the factual cause inquiry often is intertwined with societal
discrimination outside the workplace. For example, in Griggs, one rea-
son that an employer requiring a high school diploma had a disparate
impact based on race was because of existing societal inequality related
to education.125 The courts made a policy choice about when the em-
ployer would be held liable for an impact that is caused by both the em-
ployer's practices and external factors. In other contexts, courts have re-
jected disparate impact claims even if the plaintiff could fit within the
articulated framework because the court believed that Title VII, as a
matter of policy, did not prohibit employers from engaging in the actions
taken.'26
Although the first step in the ADEA disparate impact analysis is
similar to that of Title VII cases, the remaining analysis is different.'2 1
An employer may escape disparate impact liability under the ADEA, if
it demonstrates an employment decision was based on reasonable factors
other than age.128 Thus, the ADEA provides a scope of liability that is
different than that found under Title VII. The Supreme Court explained
this difference was due to textual differences between the statutes.129 It
also explained that many reasonable employment practices could corre-
late with age, creating a statistical disparity, but nonetheless be non-
discriminatory.'30 Importantly, none of the disparate impact tests mimic
the way traditional factual cause inquiries are articulated or proven.
Another feature of the causal standards is also important. Em-
ployment discrimination factual cause standards are often bracketed, de-
scribing both when the plaintiff might potentially prevail and also de-
121. Katz, supra note 86, at 495-96. Under Title VII, the plaintiff is not required to identify a
specific practice in all instances. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
122. Belton, supra note 84, at 1291-92.
123. Id. at 1267.
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
125. Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 120, at 352.
126. Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiff
cannot prevail on disparate impact claim that short leave times create disparate impact for pregnant
women).
127. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228,233-39 (2005).
128. Id. at 241-42.
129. Id. at 240-42.
130. Id. at 241-42.
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scribing circumstances when the defendant can escape liability or limit
damages.13' Thus, the statutes explicitly address situations in which the
defendant should not be liable, even if the plaintiff makes some showing
of factual cause. The bracketed nature of the factual cause question in
discrimination cases addresses many of the issues that would be relegated
to proximate cause analysis in tort law.
C. The Definition of Potential Parties and Discriminatory Conduct
As discussed in more detail below, proximate cause often is used to
limit the reach of negligence, which creates liability across a broad spec-
trum of relationships and for a broad spectrum of conduct. Employment
discrimination liability is critically different because it applies in only a
narrow set of circumstances and spectrum of relationships. The discrim-
ination statutes also specifically indicate circumstances when an employ-
er will not be liable for discrimination, even if the conduct might other-
wise be considered discriminatory without the statutory exception.3 2
Under Title VII it is unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or certain labor organizations to engage in certain types of behavior.33
Although the Supreme Court has never decided the question, the lower
courts have largely rejected individual supervisor or co-worker liability.134
In most cases, the courts are considering the liability of the employer or a
labor union for certain actions. 3 s And, these actions must happen to a
person or group of persons protected under the statutes. The statutes
generally protect applicants for employment, employees, and former
employees,136 but usually do not protect independent contractors and
volunteers.'3 1
Even within this narrow band of protected relationships, not all dis-
131. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006) (allowing employers to take action based on a "bona
fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ)); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (dis-
cussing how BFOQ brackets causal standard). These brackets are provided through various mecha-
nisms. For example, Congress created the BFOQ limit. The courts originally created the liability
brackets for motivating factor and disparate impact cases, and Congress responded to these brackets
in Title VII by amending the statute in 1991.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 200 0 e-2(e).
133. Id. § 2000e-2(a)-(c). Similar restrictions are provided in the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c)
(2006). Some joint labor-management committees may also be liable for discriminatory conduct. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The ADA, whose statutory provisions are structured differently, prohibits a
"covered entity" from discriminating in certain ways enumerated by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a),
(b) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The term "covered entity" is de-
fined to include employment agencies and labor organizations. Id. § 12111(2).
134. See, e.g., Creusere v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F. App'x 813, 822 n.12 (6th Cir. 2003); Holly D. v. Cal.
Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003).
135. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 134.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-2(a); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (indi-
cating that Title VII applies to former employees).
137. Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that independent
contractors are not protected by Title VII); Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (same for volunteers).
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criminatory conduct is prohibited. Title VII requires that there be an un-
lawful employment practice, as the statute defines that term.138 Thus, in
many cases, the plaintiff is challenging actions listed in the statutory lan-
guage, such as failure to hire, failure to promote, demotion, or termina-
tion.' In these cases, there is certainty about the type of harm Congress
sought to prevent.
The federal employment discrimination statutes also provide for li-
ability when the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" were
negatively affected because of a protected trait.140 Courts have interpret-
ed this language to require that actions rise to a certain level of serious-
ness to be cognizable under Title VII. 141 Some conduct, such as minor
social slights, never rises to the required level of seriousness. Actions
such as changing an employee's working conditions without changing the
employee's pay or placing a negative evaluation in an employee's file
may or may not affect the terms and conditions of employment, as that
term is understood in a legal sense.'42 In the harassment context, the Su-
preme Court has required that the behavior be severe or pervasive and
be both objectively and subjectively hostile. 14 3
Therefore, "liability hinges upon the showing of a causal connection
between some discriminatory action attributable to a statutory employer
and some adverse employment action suffered by an employee."1" By
statute, employment discrimination law thus deals with a narrow uni-
verse of victims, actors, and actions.
This universe is further circumscribed by available affirmative de-
fenses that allow the employer to take protected traits into consideration
in certain instances. For example, under the "bona fide occupation qual-
ification" (BFOQ) provision, the employer is allowed to make employ-
ment decisions based on a person's protected class in limited instances.145
Title VII protects certain seniority systems from statutory reach, even
though they arguably perpetuate past discrimination.'" Under the
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
139. See, e.g., Cooper v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 368 F. App'x 469, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2010) (al-
leging termination because of race).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Outside of the disparate impact context, the full implications of the
second portion of Title VII's main operative provisions have not been fully explored.
141. See, e.g., Cooper, 368 F. App'x at 474-75 (citing cases demonstrating what constitutes an ad-
verse employment action).
142. See, e.g., id. at 474 (indicating that lateral transfer is not cognizable); see also Rebecca Han-
ner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMoRY L.J. 1121, 1129 (1998) (discussing where courts
should draw lines regarding liability).
143. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57,67 (1986).
144. Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat's Paw: Delineating the Scope
of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383, 384
(2008).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
146. Id. § 2000e-2(h).
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ADEA, the employer is allowed to make decisions based on a reason-
able factor other than age, even if those decisions have a disparate im-
pact based on age.147 Under the ADA, an employer may discriminate
against an individual because of a disability, if the person is not qualified
to perform the job with or without accommodation." Thus, unlike many
common-law causes of action, the major federal employment discrimina-
tion statutes not only prohibit certain conduct, they indicate when con-
duct will not result in liability.
D. Other Limits
Federal discrimination law also has other liability-limiting princi-
ples, such as the deadlines for filing suit, court-created limits on employ-
er liability, and limits on damages.149 Each of these devices confines em-
ployment discrimination liability within a fairly fixed range.
The federal employment discrimination statutes do not contain
normal statutes of limitations. Rather, plaintiffs must file a Charge of
Discrimination with a federal or state agency within a specified time and
then must file the lawsuit within a specified time period.' If a plaintiff
does not file the Charge within the required period, the claim is usually
barred."' The time period for filing the Charge of Discrimination varies
by the type of conduct at issue. 152 For discrete discriminatory conduct,
such as a termination, plaintiffs must file a Charge within 180 or 300 days
of the discriminatory act."'
The potential scope of federal employment discrimination law also
is limited by court-created doctrine that restricts the circumstances under
which an employer will be held liable for discriminatory conduct. In
1986, the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a cognizable
claim under Title VII.15 4 The Court struggled, however, with the question
of whether employers should be automatically liable for sexual harass-
ment and left this question unresolved."' In 1998, the Supreme Court
147. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84,93 (2008).
148. See Tusing v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 639 F.3d 507, 518 (8th Cir. 2011).
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(g).
150. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The requirements under the ADEA vary slightly but still require the
filing of a Charge. See Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV24-A-D, 2010 WL 5232523, at *2
(N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (discussing how Title VII requires plaintiffs to receive a right-to-sue letter
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, while ADEA does not contain this require-
ment).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
152. Id.; Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109-10 (2002). The period begins
when the plaintiff has notice of the discriminatory action. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259
(1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (providing limits for compensation decisions); Lewis v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2010) (describing how limits work in disparate impact cases);
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 (discussing harassment).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110.
154. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,73 (1986).
155. Id. at 72.
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decided whether employers would be liable for sexual harassment by su-
pervisors in two cases, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 6 and Fara-
gher v. City of Boca Raton."' The Court held that employers would be
able to escape liability in certain instances if the employer proved a
court-created affirmative defense."" Agency doctrine is explained fur-
ther in Part IV.D, infra. For now, it is important to understand that an
employer will not be held liable for all discriminatory conduct that hap-
pens in the workplace and that the agency analysis does not mimic tradi-
tional common-law agency.
Unlike traditional common-law torts, the major federal employment
discrimination regimes contain damages provisions that explicitly limit
and calibrate damages to each particular regime.'5 These limits are im-
portant because they minimize concerns that employers will face liability
that is disproportionate to the conduct at issue.
Title VII and the ADA share a similar remedies structure that uses
the definitions of damages provisions, as well as statutory caps, to limit
liability. Compensatory damages under Title VII and the ADA are de-
fined differently than they are in a typical tort context. Compensatory
damages include "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, in-
convenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-
pecuniary losses,"'" but do not include back pay, interest on back pay, or
other relief authorized under section 70 6 (g) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.161 Title VII and the ADA both cap the total combined compensa-
tory and punitive damages a plaintiff may recover.162 The size of the cap
depends on the number of employees employed by an employer. 63 The
highest cap, which applies to employers with more than 500 employees, is
$300,000 and has not been adjusted since 1991.61
The ADEA limits damages by restricting the types of damages
available to plaintiffs. Under the ADEA, the only monetary relief that a
plaintiff may be awarded is front pay, back pay, and a liquidated damag-
156. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
157. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). By describing agency doctrine, the author is not expressing agreement
with it. For a critique of agency doctrine, see Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The
Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 3, 4-5
(2003).
158. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (providing that courts may "order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate"); Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 (amending Title VII to provide for
compensatory and punitive damages); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002) (noting
the similarity between ADA and Title VII remedies).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
161. Id. § 1981a(b)(2).
162. Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
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es award. 6' The plaintiff may not be awarded compensatory or punitive
damages.' Each of these regimes provides limited damages. The pre-
existing damage limits are expressions about the extent of liability and
must be considered when deciding whether to import proximate cause. 67
E. The Space for Proximate Cause
The employment discrimination statutes contemplate limits on lia-
bility in multiple ways. These direct expressions eliminate, or at least
significantly constrain, any space potentially available for common-law
proximate cause to operate. Any proximate cause analysis used in em-
ployment discrimination statutes cannot be coterminous with common
law. Further, any proximate cause analysis must be conducted by defin-
ing its specific goal or goals.
As discussed above, proximate cause is often associated with
whether there is a foreseeable plaintiff, whether there is an intervening
cause, whether consequences could be reasonably anticipated, or the
slightly different, but often related, question of whether the harm caused
was within the scope of risk of the defendant's conduct.6 Proximate
cause is also described through a line-drawing rationale.'69
The employment discrimination statutes and related court-created
agency doctrine address questions regarding the foreseeability of the
plaintiff and reasonably anticipated consequences by limiting the types of
plaintiffs who have viable claims and by requiring those plaintiffs to have
certain statutorily defined relationships with the defendant."' The feder-
al employment statutes also prescribe the types of conduct that result in
liability. Given the way the courts have interpreted these provisions, the
employer faces a fairly limited spectrum of acts that will result in liability.
Thus, an employer will not be held liable if one of its employees engages
in sexual harassment that is not severe or pervasive."' Nor will it be held
liable if a plaintiff is subject to minor social slights or other actions that
are not considered to rise to the level of an adverse employment action,
even if these actions are taken because of a protected trait.17 2
165. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (2006).
166. Id. § 216(b). But see Carol Abdelmesseh & Deanne M. DiBlasi, Note, Why Punitive Damag-
es Should Be Awarded for Retaliatory Discharge Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 21 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 715, 748 (2004) (discussing whether punitive damages are available for retaliation
claims).
167. Importantly, when caps are placed on tort causes of action, such as medical malpractice, the
underlying tort action already incorporates proximate cause. In the employment discrimination con-
text, courts would be explicitly recognizing proximate cause after Congress has spoken about liability
limits.
168. See supra Part I.B.
169. See supra Part I.B.
170. See supra Part II.C.
171. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
172. Id.
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Additionally, the statutes specifically enunciate instances in which it
is lawful for an employer to take actions based on a protected trait.
Thus, an employer could hire a person based on her sex, if sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification for the position.7 3 Congress has provided
(or the courts have interpreted the discrimination statutes as providing) a
defined spectrum of potential liability that directly addresses the core
concerns of proximate cause.17 4 Court-created agency doctrine further
limits when an employer will be liable for the acts of individuals."'
If proximate cause is concerned about whether some intervening ac-
tion cuts off the original actor's liability,"' Congress has already spoken
to this concept, as well, at least for certain statutes. Congress amended
Title VII in 1991 to indicate what a plaintiff must prove when more than
one cause contributed to the discrimination."' In doing so, Congress
chose to impose liability on employers, even if the employer could prove
it would have taken the same decision absent the protected trait.",
If proximate cause is concerned with line drawing, the courts risk
upsetting a complex statutory regime by importing proximate cause. The
statutory regime considers the defendant's recklessness or intention to
harm, the relative wrongfulness of the parties' conduct, whether the ex-
tent of liability was out of proportion to the degree of wrongfulness, and
the perceived purpose of the obligations created by the statutory re-
gime."' Further, in the employment discrimination context, these policy
decisions have evolved over time, as the courts have interpreted the stat-
utory language and Congress has responded to the courts' interpreta-
tions.
Importantly, any court considering using proximate cause in dis-
crimination statutes must specifically define which of its underlying goals
it is trying to further."8 As discussed throughout this Article, the lan-
guage of the statute clearly addresses many of proximate cause's goals.
To the extent that the language does not fully address all of proximate
cause's goals, the language at least severely diminishes the available
space for the common-law doctrine. Statutory proximate cause is not co-
terminous with common-law proximate cause.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
174. See supra Part I.C.
175. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
176. The term "superseding cause" is often used to refer to an intervening force that is sufficient
to cut off liability from the original tortfeasor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 34 cmt. b.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
178. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
179. See Stapleton, supra note 22, at 985-86.
180. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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III. WEAK STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has issued several
important opinions regarding whether proximate cause should be used in
interpreting statutory regimes.'8' In other work, I demonstrate how
courts often use weak textual, intent, and purpose-based arguments to
justify importing proximate cause into statutes and how the courts are in-
sufficiently sensitive to separation of powers concerns. 82 This Part ex-
plores how those same kinds of weak arguments are likely to be used by
the courts in the employment discrimination context. It begins in Section
A by briefly exploring statutory interpretation and separation of powers.
Section B demonstrates why common arguments used to import proxi-
mate cause into statutes generally do not apply to discrimination statutes.
A. Statutory Interpretation and Separation of Powers
In thinking about statutory interpretation, it is important to remem-
ber that it is a way courts often express concerns about separation of
powers. Under the Constitution, Congress is vested with legislative pow-
er, and the courts have the power to interpret the laws that Congress cre-
ates.'83 Separation of powers thus contemplates a line between constru-
ing an existing statutory regime and creating a statutory regime. While
there is strong disagreement regarding how much latitude courts have to
interpret statutes," there is at least agreement that this space is often
more constrained than it would be in a pure common-law context.
181. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (considering proximate cause under
USERRA); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453 (2006) (under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-46
(2005) (in case alleging securities fraud); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 703-04 (2004) (under
Federal Tort Claims Act); Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 325-26 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (un-
der Bankruptcy Code); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1992) (under
RICO); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
535-36 (1983) (under Clayton Act); see also Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct.
680, 692 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that proximate cause is typically applied in negligence
cases); Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 754 (2004) (reasoning that the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires a causal standard similar to proximate cause); Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA)). But see CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641
(2011) (refusing to import traditional common-law proximate cause into Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA), but holding that the statutory language itself places a different proximate cause limit on
the statute).
182. Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
184. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 5; POPKIN, supra note 2, at 45, 67; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 348 (1990);
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 70, 78 (2006);
Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 355-56 (2005); William D. Popkin, The Col-
laborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541, 594 (1988).
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There also is strong disagreement regarding the appropriate meth-
ods and goals courts may use when construing statutes. These are the
tensions inherent in competing models of statutory interpretation, such
as textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. 5 This Article does not
make any normative claims about these competing visions of statutory
interpretation. Rather, it argues that to the extent courts interpret stat-
utes in ways that are disingenuous or not credible, then it is proper to be
skeptical about whether courts are interpreting statutes or overstepping
their judicial role.
B. Common Statutory Proximate Cause Analysis
This Section demonstrates that most arguments used to justify im-
porting proximate cause into other statutes are not convincing in the em-
ployment discrimination context. It focuses on textual, intent, and pur-
pose-based arguments because these are the kinds of arguments courts
tend to use in statutory proximate cause cases."'
The clearest case for applying proximate cause would be if the stat-
ute itself expressly uses the words "proximate cause." Congress has used
these words in many statutes."' None of the major federal employment
discrimination statutes use the words "proximate cause."', One strong
argument against implying proximate cause from general causal language
is that Congress understands how to designate proximate cause by name.
If Congress does not use the words "proximate cause," the legislature did
not intend to limit the statute using proximate cause principles. 89
Further, the language in Title VII's primary operative provisions is
different than traditional tort articulations of cause. As discussed earlier,
Title VII's primary operative provisions, which were originally enacted in
1964, contain two subparts." Although the first subpart uses "because
of" language, courts have not interpreted Title VII's factual cause stan-
dards to be consistent with the common law."' Further, courts seem to
use this language to refer to both intent and causation. In 1991, Congress
185. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
20 (1988) (describing various statutory interpretation techniques).
186. See generally cases cited supra note 181 (Supreme Court opinions considering proximate
cause in the context of various statutes).
187. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006) (providing that plaintiffs may recover damages in ex-
cess of cap if a showing of proximate cause is made); Act of June 5, 1924, ch. 261, § 2, 43 Stat. 389
(United States liable for "any disease proximately caused" by federal employment); Act of Oct. 6,
1917, ch. 105, § 306, 40 Stat. 407 (United States liable to member of Armed Forces for post-discharge
disability that "proximately result[ed] from [a pre-discharge] injury"); Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, § 1,
39 Stat. 742-43 (United States not liable to injured employee whose "intoxication ... is the proximate
cause of the injury").
188. See supra Part II.A.
189. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998).
190. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part II.B.
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added new language to Title VII to provide a structure for disparate im-
pact claims and to allow a plaintiff to prevail by establishing that a pro-
tected trait is a motivating factor in a decision." Neither of these provi-
sions mimics traditional tort language regarding causation.
Any discussion of Title VII's operative language would also need to
consider that the central provision has two subparts. The second subpart
provides that the employer cannot "limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees or applicants for employment in any way."'93 This language is
different than traditional ways of articulating causation.
In other instances, courts often look to general causal language
within a statute and then conclude that these terms refer to both cause in
fact and proximate cause.194 The modern federal employment discrimina-
tion statutes provide that certain actions cannot be taken "because of" a
defined protected class.115 Given this "because of" language it is certainly
plausible to make a superficial argument that proximate cause should be
imported.'" In negligence cases, common-law courts use the term "cau-
sation" to refer to both factual and legal cause,'0 and it could be argued
that those words "because of" have the same meaning in federal discrim-
ination law. If the courts import proximate cause analysis into discrimi-
nation law, this kind of cursory statutory interpretation is likely to occur.
This argument fails as a convincing statutory anchor for discrimina-
tion claims for several reasons. First, as discussed throughout this Arti-
cle, employment discrimination law is not generally drawn from tort law,
so it is difficult to understand why courts would assume causal language
was meant to import tort concepts.' A major contribution of this Arti-
cle is to demonstrate that courts' claims that discrimination law draws
from common-law torts are not specific enough to be meaningful.
Second, this argument ignores that proximate cause varies, depend-
ing on whether the underlying claim is based on negligence or intentional
conduct. As discussed in Part IV.A, none of the discrimination claims
192. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
194. See, e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,265-68 (1992).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(a) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (ADEA). USERRA's language
is both similar and dissimilar to Title VII language. USERRA prohibits certain actions from being
taken "on the basis of' military status. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2006). USERRA later provides that an
employer engages in unlawful discrimination when military status "is a motivating factor in the em-
ployer's action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of
such membership, application for membership, service, application for service, or obligation for ser-
vice." Id. §4311(c)(1).
196. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 536 (1995) (indi-
cating that "caused by" language in statute requires proximate cause).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see, e.g., A.B. ex. rel. C.D. v. Stone Cnty. Sch. Dist., 14 So. 3d 794,800
(Miss. Ct. App. 2009). The author is not making any claims about whether this argument should rely
on purely textualist claims or also on legislative history or underlying statutory purpose.
198. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1229
(2001) (noting that super-statutes change the common-law baseline).
No. 1] 29
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
map well onto tort claims, like negligence, where proximate cause is most
commonly invoked.
Third, relying on general causal language ignores that Congress ex-
presses concerns about limiting liability throughout statutory regimes.
As shown in Part II, the employment discrimination statutes are complex
regimes that calibrate limits on liability through a variety of mechanisms.
These expressions are often more concrete and direct than the general
causal language and must be considered when deciding whether space
remains for proximate cause.
Finally, both Congress and the courts have rejected common-law
analysis in the factual cause context. For example, in the 1991 amend-
ments to Title VII, Congress indicated that a plaintiff could prevail in a
discrimination case by showing that a protected trait played a motivating
factor in an employment decision.'" This motivating factor standard
does not mimic common-law articulations of factual cause.211 In the
ADEA context, the Supreme Court held the "because of" language in
the ADEA only referred to "but-for" causation, even though common-
law courts often use that terminology to refer to other factual cause
standards.201
Even if a weak argument exists that courts may anchor proximate
cause in general causal language, other features of employment discrimi-
nation statutes also point away from proximate cause. Congress did not
refer to proximate cause when enacting Title VII. Indeed, any discussion
of legislative history with respect to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is necessarily short, because "[t]he legislative history of Title VII
has virtually been declared judicially incomprehensible." 2' Given the
broad scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII was just
one portion, there was little discussion regarding the meaning of the
words in Title VII. Nor did Congress engage in any extensive discussion
about Title VII and the common law. There is evidence that when Con-
gress looked to prior law, it looked at other discrimination statutes and
executive orders that pre-dated Title VII.203
Congress did discuss causal language before enacting the 1991
amendments to Title VII. It is clear from the legislative history, howev-
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
200. Katz, supra note 86, at 502,505-06.
201. See, e.g., Lasley v. Combined Transp., Inc., 261 P.3d 1215, 1219-20 (Or. 2011) (noting that
factual cause means whether the conduct played a substantial factor in harm)............
202. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1138 n.7 (5th Cir. 1971); see also
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Act (1985) (exploring the tortured legislative history of Title VII); H.R. Rep. No.
914 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS Act
OF 1964, at 2112 (describing how ambiguous the statutory language is).
203. EEOC, supra note 202, at 1 (describing early federal discrimination statutes); id. at 2 (de-
scribing the Fair Employment Practice Committee); id. at 3-5 (describing executive orders); id. at 5-6
(describing state anti-discrimination statutes).
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er, that Congress largely focused not on the common-law definitions of
terms, but rather on responding to earlier Supreme Court decisions,
which created frameworks for disparate impact and mixed-motive
claims.20 As discussed in Part II.B, these court-created frameworks did
not derive from the common law.
In other contexts, courts also have used two weak intent claims to
import proximate cause into regimes: that the particular statute derives
from a common-law tradition2 05 and that civil statutes in general are pre-
sumed to draw from a common-law tradition.2' This second argument
played a role in Staub, the decision where the Court used proximate
cause in the context of USERRA and hinted such analysis would apply
to Title VII. To determine the meaning of USERRA's motivating factor
language, the Court started with the premise that "when Congress cre-
ates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law."7 In
Staub, the Court made no inquiry into whether Congress adopted
USERRA specifically using the common law as a background.
There is no legislative history for Title VII that suggests its primary
operative provisions derive from a common-law tradition. Indeed, the
federal employment discrimination statutes create significant exceptions
to common-law notions of at-will employment.2 08 Further, there is no
204. 137 CONG. REC. 28,717 (1991) (discussing the compromises needed to pass the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 and also noting that its terms of art were created by the courts and not by the legislature);
id. at 28,715 (noting that purpose of the disparate impact provisions was to put Griggs back in place);
id. at 28,720 (noting that the purpose of the Act was also to respond to Price Waterhouse); id at 56,750
(indicating that amendments are designed not to turn Title VII into a national tort law); id. at 56,780
(noting that it would be problematic to use tort-style remedies for Title VII); t BERNARD D. REAMS,
JR. & FAYE COUTURE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW
102-166, 505 (1994) (looking at disparate impact causal language in reference to Griggs and how courts
had interpreted standard since Griggs); id. at 507-08 (arguing that the purpose of the amendments is
to restore and codify Griggs); id. at 508 (specifically noting that courts are not dealing with common-
law standards with respect to disparate impact). The legislative history does contain some discussion
of the appropriate causal standard. 137 CONG. REC. S15,319 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (noting that
cause is required in disparate impact, but not indicating proximate cause specifically); REAMS &
COUTURE, supra, at 498 (discussing how the term "causal connection" would be a better choice for
disparate impact analysis and invoking Palsgraf, but not truly discussing proximate cause); id. at 504
(further discussing putting word "cause" into disparate impact and discussing the proximate relation-
ship, but not discussing proximate cause); id at 505 (discussing the word "contributes" in statutory
language and equating it with causes in part, without reference to common law understandings; also
using the words "significant part"). It is especially difficult to determine how arguments regarding the
1991 amendments would affect proximate cause analysis because it is unclear how the 1991 amend-
ments affect the original statutory language. ESKRIDGE, supra note 63, at 80 (discussing how 1991
amendments did not seriously consider original intent of the legislature in 1964).
205. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
529,531 (1983).
206. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). The proximate cause discussion in
Staub is arguably dicta. Nonetheless, it highlights an approach courts use to import proximate cause
into statutes.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,628-29 (1996) (discussing how discrimination statutes
are different than the common law); Howard v. Wolff Broadcasting Corp., 611 So. 2d 307, 312-13
(Ala. 1992) (noting that common law does not prohibit terminating an employee because of her sex).
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reason to generally presume that modern statutes derive from the com-
mon law.
The only intent argument that can credibly be made regarding em-
ployment discrimination law is that the statutes are ambiguous as to
proximate cause or that Congress intentionally left gaps in the statutes,
such that the courts are required to exercise a gap-filling role. As dis-
cussed in Part II, however, the employment discrimination statutes ex-
pressly address many of the underlying concerns of proximate cause.
Even if there arguably is room for proximate cause, it would not be co-
terminous with common-law proximate cause.
Proximate cause also might be used in a statute, if the purpose of
the statute suggests it. Courts commonly recite three purposes for the
federal employment discrimination statutes. First, the Supreme Court
has stated that the purpose of Title VII is "to assure equality of employ-
ment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and
devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens."' It has also indicated that the pur-
pose of the statute is not to provide a remedy for discrimination, but to
prevent it from happening in the first place. 210 Other courts have noted
that Title VII is a broad civil rights statute.211
When proximate cause is an element of a case and the plaintiff is
unable to establish the element, there is a finding of no liability for the
defendant. If proximate cause is applied to employment discrimination
cases, the courts would essentially be saying that even though a plaintiff's
protected class played a role in an employment action, what happened to
that plaintiff is not discrimination. Such reasoning is contrary to the
broad purposes of the employment discrimination statutes. There are
strong reasons for calling actions discrimination, even if the employer is
absolved of liability or its liability is limited through other mechanisms.
Despite general purposes that point in the direction of broad liabil-
ity within the existing statutory restrictions, the Supreme Court has used
the purposes of Title VII to limit when an employer would be liable for
certain discriminatory acts.212 Further, in other contexts, the Court has
read proximate cause as being consistent with congressional direction to
liberally construe the statute.213 Thus, the broad purposes of Title VII
will likely not deter courts from importing proximate cause.
When importing proximate cause into statutes, courts also use an-
209. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
210. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998). The use of proximate cause im-
pacts whether Title VII is concerned only with remedying past harms or whether it is a broader ex-
pression of public policy.
211. Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979) ("We believe that broad re-
medial legislation such as Title VII is entitled to the benefit of liberal construction.").
212. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 (allowing employers to escape liability in certain instances).
213. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992).
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other weak purpose-based argument: that it is unlikely that Congress in-
tended to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover.' Given the
narrow spectrum of relationships and harms addressed by the employ-
ment discrimination statutes, plaintiffs are not usually alleging cases that
are factually absurd in the same way that some negligence claims can be.
Further, discrimination statutes protect fundamental societal interests,
but do so in a narrow way. Given the statutory restrictions, all viable dis-
crimination claims involve conduct that has occurred in or related to the
workplace, that has met particular factual cause standards, and that has
been deemed serious enough to affect the terms or conditions of a per-
son's employment. Given this narrow space, there are strong arguments
that even attenuated claims should fall within the statutes' coverage.
This purpose argument also is weak because there is little reason to
assume that proximate cause is the only or even the best way to limit a
statute's reach or to avoid absurd results. As discussed in Part II, the
employment discrimination statutes already provide limits, and there is
no reason that courts should look to proximate cause before considering
whether the absurd result can be avoided through other mechanisms.
This fact is especially important because proximate cause draws from
multiple evolving and contested goals and thus introduces confusion into
statutory analysis. As a matter of prudence, courts should be reluctant to
turn to proximate cause to resolve liability limitation problems.2 1 1
Finally, it might be argued that Title VII has a gap that the courts
could fill by using a common-law or some other similar kind of interpre-
tive technique. When engaging in common-law decision making, the
court could then look to the proximate cause doctrine to fill the gap.
Such an argument rests on many faulty premises. First, it assumes
that the statute does not already address the underlying concerns of
proximate cause. Second, it assumes that common-law proximate cause
is the appropriate place to ground such decision making. As discussed
throughout this Article it is unclear why judges would look to the com-
mon law to define terms in a statutory regime whose operative provisions
are not drawn from the common law and that does not mimic the com-
mon law, especially given that the courts have interpreted the factual
cause standards differently than the common law. Further, it is im-
portant not to confuse the common law with common-law decision mak-
214. Id. at 266 n.10.
215. This Section has examined interpretation largely through the lens of textualism, intentional-
ism, and purposivism because these are the arguments the courts use to justify their conclusions re-
garding statutory proximate cause. Sperino, supra note 182, Part II. Outside the proximate cause con-
text, courts sometimes use a common-law methodology when preemptive lawmaking is required to
preserve the statutory mandate. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 184, at 359. Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that a common-law construction approach would be
inappropriate in Title VII cases. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800,818-19 (1983).
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ing. In other words, judges may claim to be doing the latter, without us-
ing the common law as the baseline for its reasoning.
It is also necessary to be skeptical about whether judges are using
arguments about torts and common law as a fagade for other goals. As
discussed in later Sections, the Supreme Court has claimed in the past
that it is applying common-law agency principles to Title VII, while
enunciating legal standards that depart significantly from the common
law.2 16 If judges are not actually importing common-law proximate cause,
they should not claim its mantle in order to do other work. Rather than
pretend to apply the common law, the judges should explain that they
are engaging in policy-based gap filling and explain why they have the
authority to do so. Only through more explicit dialogue can we properly
understand the relationship between the courts, the common law, and
modern statutes.
This Part demonstrates the common text, intent, or purpose-based
arguments that courts use to import proximate cause into statutes gener-
ally do not apply to the employment discrimination statutes. More im-
portantly, even if the courts could find an appropriate statutory hook for
proximate cause, this would not assist the courts in determining which of
proximate cause's many goals should be imported into the statutory re-
gime.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES AND POSSIBLE PROBLEMS
Even if some plausible statutory hook existed for importing proxi-
mate cause into employment discrimination statutes, theoretical, doctrin-
al, and practical reasons militate against it. This Part addresses broader
concerns about using proximate cause in employment discrimination cas-
es.
A. Employment Discrimination Claims Do Not Map Well Onto
Common-Law Torts
The Supreme Court has indicated that federal discrimination stat-
utes were created in reference to tort law.2 17 However, this premise is not
demonstrably true for most modern employment discrimination statutes.
Indeed the primary operative provisions of these statutes are so contrary
to the common law that it is odd to presume that while they created large
exceptions to common-law notions of at-will employment, they retained
its underlying concepts. 218 In most states, without the existence of federal
216. See infra Part IV.D.
217. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
218. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006); Belton, supra note 84, at 1242 (noting that
discrimination law does not derive from the common law). This argument relates to broader claims
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employment discrimination law or a state-law corollary, the common law
would allow the employer to terminate an individual based on a protect-
ed trait.219 Further, as discussed in Part II.B, the courts and Congress
have not followed traditional common-law articulations for defining fac-
tual cause. To date, no court has convincingly explained why it assumes
that federal discrimination statutes draw from the common law.220 Even
if it could be argued that the discrimination statutes derive from tort law
or from the common law, this statement would provide no meaningful
guidance on whether to use proximate cause.
Tort law can be defined as being "about the wrongs that a private
litigant must establish to entitle her to a court's assistance in obtaining a
remedy and the remedies that will be made available to her."2 21 Another
common definition of a tort is a "civil wrong, other than breach of con-
tract, for which the court will provide a remedy." 222 In this general sense,
it is appropriate to conceive of federal employment discrimination law as
a "contemporary extension[] of tort law" 223 and placing it within this gen-
eral category is not problematic.
Indeed, courts and commentators have often referred to employ-
ment discrimination law as a tort. In Staub, for example, the Court indi-
cated that "when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the back-
ground of general tort law." 224 And a leading torts treatise indicates that
"[c]ivil rights violations are torts." 225
Once courts proceed beyond these general statements about torts
and discrimination law, their analysis becomes problematic.2 6  These
general statements are not nuanced enough to determine whether prox-
imate cause should be imported into employment discrimination law.
They ignore that neither proximate cause nor employment discrimina-
tion law is monolithic. Rather, each changes depending on the factual
about statutes and the common law generally, which were explored in Sperino, supra note 182. The
changing relationship between statutes and the common law has been noted for more than 100 years.
Pound, supra note 2.
219. Howard v. Wolff Broadcasting Corp., 611 So. 2d 307, 312-13 (Ala. 1992).
220. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003) (draw-
ing from common-law concepts of employee without providing convincing rationale, but ultimately
creating a different definition relying on EEOC Compliance Manual); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71-72 (1986) (suggesting, without much support, that Title VII might refer to
common-law concepts of agency).
221. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 919.
222. KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, § 1, at 2.
223. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 919.
224. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
225. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 44, at 81 (2001).
226. For example, calling discrimination statutes a tort has important implications regarding
whether Title VII should be conceived as a mechanism for remedying individual harms or whether it
should be construed more broadly. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE
MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010); Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress and Employment At Will: The Case Against "Tortification" of Labor and Em-
ployment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994); Zemelman, supra note 3, at 193-97.
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circumstances in which it is used. Such concern is noted in the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts, which warns that "provisions on scope of liability
in this Chapter, which are centered on liability for physical and emotion-
al harm, may not be appropriate in other contexts."227
Placing employment discrimination within the realm of torts is dan-
gerous if its placement there means it must be fixed within one or more
of the traditional categories of tort law, such as intentional torts, negli-
gence, or strict liability. And, in order to apply proximate cause princi-
ples to discrimination law, it is necessary to draw on these traditional
categories because proximate cause is not a fixed concept.
Rather, the doctrine of proximate cause morphs depending on the
context in which it is being applied, with proximate cause hardly ever be-
ing an issue in intentional tort cases.228 Various reasons exist for this dif-
ferential treatment. First, "the requirement in negligence cases that the
plaintiff's harm be an expectable or foreseeable consequence of the de-
fendant's actions does not apply to intentional torts."229 Second, courts
express less concern about limiting a defendant's liability in situations
where the defendant has acted with the requisite intent, which in many
instances means that the defendant is considered to be morally blame-
worthy.20 Third, in intentional tort cases, "the defendant's wrongful
conduct is [usually] closely linked-temporally and conceptually-to the
plaintiff's harm." 231 Fourth, the risks of inefficient overdeterrence are
lessened in intentional tort cases. 2  And, finally, many traditional inten-
tional tort cases do not involve multiple causes.2 33
Given these differences, it is not sufficient to determine that em-
ployment discrimination cases are like torts in some general sense. Rath-
er, it is necessary to ask which traditional tort do the statutes most mimic.
The answer to this question is not uniform across the statutory regimes,
but rather varies with the type of claim, depending on whether it is a dis-
parate treatment claim, a harassment claim, or a disparate impact
claim.234 Importantly, it would never be appropriate to apply a single no-
tion of proximate cause to all discrimination claims.
Even if one is willing to abandon a unified application of proximate
cause, it is quite difficult to map employment discrimination claims onto
traditional tort causes of action. This discussion begins by describing
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 29 cmt. c.
228. Belton, supra note 84, at 1250; David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1773 n.30 (1997).
229. Fisch, supra note 56, at 832.
230. Id. at 832-33.
231. Id. at 832.
232. Id. at 833.
233. Id. at 832.
234. See Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal
About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 259, 265-66 (2008) (arguing that civil rights
law should not be bound to one concept of fault).
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overarching difficulties with comparing employment discrimination law
to negligence law and then considers whether each of the types of em-
ployment discrimination have analogs in traditional tort categories.
One of the central problems with borrowing a proximate cause
analysis largely applied in the context of negligence law is that the stan-
dard was mostly developed in the context of physical harms. Thus, when
courts cite extreme cases in which proximate cause limits liability, the ex-
amples are almost uniformly ones involving multiple physical actions.
For example, the Supreme Court has indicated that proximate cause
would limit liability under the Endangered Species Act if a tornado lifted
fertilizer from a farmer's tilled field and deposited the fertilizer in a wild-
life refuge where it injured an endangered species. 21
Discrimination claims outside of the harassment context ordinarily
do not involve physical injury in the same way.236 Indeed, it is difficult to
define the harms of discrimination in a singular way. The harms of dis-
crimination are often economic in nature, but discrimination also in-
volves harms to personal dignity, equality norms, as well as group harms.
As Martha Chamallas has noted, "such claims often articulate a type of
injury-disproportionately experienced by members of subordinated
groups-that cannot be pinned down as psychological, economic, or
physical in nature, or as either individual or group based."23 7 The "multi-
dimensional quality of the harm" in employment discrimination cases
"defies categorization under traditional headings" and makes it prob-
lematic to map traditional proximate cause onto discrimination.238
Even if one ignores these difficulties, none of the traditionally rec-
ognized discrimination types is enough like negligence to justify import-
ing proximate cause. For disparate treatment law, the closest tort analo-
gy is intentional torts, not negligence. But this comparison, too, is only
true in a general sense, because it ignores two important factors: whether
individual disparate treatment cases actually require a showing of intent
and whether the intent required is similar to the type required in inten-
tional tort cases.
Describing the intent necessary for traditional common-law inten-
tional torts is not an easy task. However, it is possible to rely on rudi-
mentary descriptions of this intent to show the difficulty of importing
proximate cause into employment discrimination cases. Common-law
intent is often described as being concerned with the subjective mental
state of the actor, which is ascertained from the available evidence. The
235. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
236. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2115,2140 (2007).
237. Id. at 2147.
238. Id. at 2146-47.
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defendant is liable if it engaged in a volitional act that it knew or with a
substantial certainty knew that its actions would cause interference with
other people or property.23 9 Some torts impose a higher intent require-
ment, essentially requiring something like mens rea.24
Scholars disagree on whether disparate treatment cases require a
showing of intent, both as a descriptive and a normative matter.241 Even
if it is possible to say that, as a descriptive matter, courts require plain-
tiffs to establish intent in disparate treatment cases, this intent standard is
itself inconsistent. When some courts describe intent, they describe it as
requiring animus, which is more akin to the higher mens rea-like re-
quirement imposed for a few intentional torts.242 Courts have been skep-
tical of arguments that the defendant could be liable for intentional dis-
crimination if it knew with substantial certainty that its actions were
causing differential treatment based on a protected trait.243 Thus, the
concept of intent in employment discrimination cases fits uncomfortably
within traditional tort descriptions of intent. This fact is important for
proximate cause analysis. If proximate cause is less robust in intentional
tort cases than it is in negligence cases, it should play even less of a role
in cases that require a stricter definition of intent than that required for
most intentional torts.
It is at least possible to state that most intentional discrimination
cases, at least descriptively, are not negligence cases. Applying a proxi-
mate cause analysis developed in the negligence context is therefore
problematic. In many disparate treatment cases, the discriminatory ac-
tors are acting in a morally blameworthy way, and at least their conduct
results in a socially undesirable end. Even if the actors are not acting at
the direction of the employer, agency analysis has been used to deter-
mine that there is some reason to hold the employer liable for the ac-
tions. Negligence law is often detached from ideas of wrongdoing,2" and
so may be less concerned with allowing some defendants to escape liabil-
ity to accomplish other goals.
Further, as discussed throughout this Article, negligence law needs
the idea of proximate cause given the unknowable nature of the relation-
239. Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Wash. 1955). The exact articulation of intent var-
ies depending on the intentional tort at issue.
240. Black, supra note 234, at 278-79.
241. See, e.g., id. at 270-71; Oppenheimer, supra note 80, at 920-21; Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the
Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination
Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1141, 1145 (2007); Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Water-
house: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1118, 1136-37 (1991).
See generally Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimina-
tion in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001) (analyzing the intent re-
quirement in the context of disparate treatment claims involving more than one actor).
242. See Black, supra note 234, at 278-79.
243. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (rejecting idea that
plaintiffs might be able to establish this claim on a nationwide basis).
244. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 925-26.
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ships and conduct that might create liability. The employment discrimi-
nation statutes more narrowly define the relationships and conduct at is-
sue. Given the notion of intent commonly applied in disparate treatment
cases, the actors' actions are closely linked to the resulting harm. Indeed
a central criticism of modern employment discrimination law is its focus
on ferreting out a discrete set of events that can be connected to specific
actors.245
Negligence's causal standards allow for multiple causes to satisfy the
requirements of factual cause. Many intentional discrimination cases do
not involve multiple causes. Even those that do involve multiple causes
are fundamentally different than multiple cause negligence cases. In
negligence cases, questions about multiple cause usually involve inde-
pendent actors. When there are multiple causes in employment discrim-
ination cases, these multiple causes are often created by the employer or
its employees. When the plaintiff or other outside actors are in part re-
sponsible for the adverse action, the plaintiff may not be able to establish
that discrimination was a motivating factor in the action or the plaintiff's
recovery may be diminished if the employer can establish the same-
decision defense.2 46  Agency doctrine also may prevent the employer
from being liable for the action.
There are some ways, however, that intentional discrimination cases
are unlike intentional torts and that may make proximate cause analysis
more appealing than in the traditional intentional tort context. Given
that the employer is the entity held liable for the actions of individuals, it
is possible that without proximate cause, there is a risk of overdeter-
rence. Further, in some multiple cause cases, the employer may be held
liable even when the plaintiff's conduct or the conduct of others contrib-
uted to the final decision. These policies, however, are already handled
by either the substantive employment discrimination law or ancillary
doctrines.247
Disparate impact shares traits with strict liability and negligence,
depending on how the plaintiff would prevail in a given suit.2 48 In some
cases, a plaintiff may prevail by establishing a particular employment
245. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After
Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353,354 (2008).
246. For example, the plaintiff may not be able to establish that the protected trait played a moti-
vating factor in the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
247. Similar concerns exist for harassment cases. The Supreme Court has noted that "[s]exual
harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742,756 (1998). But see generally L. Camille H6bert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment:
Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341 (2005) (considering the viability of a disparate impact
sexual harassment claim); Robert A. Kearney, The Disparate Impact Hostile Environment Claim: Sex-
ual Harassment Scholarship at a Crossroads, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 185, 215 (2003) (consider-
ing the viability of a disparate impact sexual harassment claim). The closest common-law corollary for
harassment claims is not negligence, but rather intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
IIED, however, is not an exact fit with harassment.
248. Oppenheimer, supra note 80, at 931-36.
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practice created a large disparity based on a protected trait, if the em-
ployer is not able to establish an affirmative defense to liability.249 In Ti-
tle VII cases, the defendant may prevail by showing that its practice was
job-related and consistent with business necessity.25 0 The defendant is li-
able whether or not it intended to create the disparity, and even if it took
reasonable measures to try to prevent it. Thus, these cases share com-
monalities with strict liability.
In Title VII disparate impact cases, a plaintiff also may prevail by
establishing that the employer could have adopted less discriminatory al-
ternate practices, but chose not to do so. 251 These cases sound more like
negligence as the employer is being held liable for its failure to take rea-
sonable care to prevent disparate results. 25 2
Even though disparate impact might be more closely analogized to
torts cases where proximate cause analysis is appropriate, the analogy is
still inapt. The substantive standard requires the plaintiff to prove much
more than a tort plaintiff. The plaintiff must identify the specific em-
ployment practice at issue and that practice must be tied to a specific
kind of outcome23 Further, courts require significant statistical proof
regarding disparity based on a protected trait. 254 The affirmative defens-
es allowed in disparate impact cases do not mimic common-law defenses.
In many contexts, disparate impact effectuates a policy decision
about when employers will be liable for allowing societal discrimination
to enter the workplace. Congress and the courts have addressed the in-
herent policy questions about whether employers should be liable for
disparate impact. In the Title VII context, Congress specifically codified
statutory language to overrule a more defendant-friendly standard enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court.
Another feature of employment discrimination law separates it
from other doctrines. Under the federal discrimination statutes, individ-
ual supervisors and coworkers cannot typically be held liable for discrim-
inatory conduct.255 In most cases, the use of proximate cause to limit the
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i).
250. Id.
251. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
252. Oppenheimer, supra note 80, at 931-36.
253. Id. at 929-30. Under Title VII, a plaintiff may allege that combined practices created a dis-
parate impact only if the plaintiff can show that the practices are not capable of separation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(B).
254. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that statistical evidence must reveal "a disparity so great that it cannot reasonably be attributed to
chance").
255. See supra note 134 (citing cases). State discrimination law may allow recovery in some in-
stances. In instances involving physical violence, battery, or assault, criminal or tort law may provide
recovery against the individual employee. In rare instances, plaintiffs may be able to proceed against
the perpetrator under intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress theories. Chamallas,
supra note 236, at 2120, 2133 (noting the varying degrees to which workplace intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims have been successful). In many instances, however, courts have been reluc-
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employer's liability will mean that no one will be held responsible for the
underlying conduct.
Perhaps most importantly, the move to tort law would clearly be a
change from the way the courts and Congress initially perceived Title
VII's primary operative provisions. It is unlikely that the courts would
have interpreted Title VII as providing for disparate impact claims, if the
statute was supposed to mimic common-law understandings of causation.
Likewise, the courts would not create the McDonnell Douglas test if they
thought Title VII mimicked the common law. Subsequent amendments
to Title VII make a tort analysis less compelling. Congress's addition of
a disparate impact framework does not mimic traditional common law.
The motivating factor framework with its limited affirmative defense to
damages does not reflect the common law. If the courts apply common-
law proximate cause principles to Title VII they would need to integrate
these principles with a factual cause analysis that does not sound in tradi-
tional tort law.
The most convincing application of proximate cause would be if
courts recognized a claim for negligent discrimination. However, even
though the two claims might have a cursory resemblance, it is likely that
negligent discrimination claims would not fit comfortably within the
common-law tradition. First, as discussed throughout this Article, the
discrimination statutes only allow liability in a set of cases that is already
more narrowly circumscribed than negligence law. Second, it is unlikely
that the courts will create a negligent discrimination standard that mimics
negligence law in all important ways. These same arguments hold for
unconscious and structural discrimination, which have less causal resem-
blance to negligence law, but might end up resembling strict liability
claims.
As this Section demonstrates, all employment discrimination claims
cannot be analogized to common-law torts where proximate cause usual-
ly plays a role. At best, a court wanting to apply proximate cause would
need to analyze each type of discrimination claim to see if there is an an-
alytical fit. It is difficult to match the types of discrimination to tradi-
tional torts.
B. Integrating Specific Proximate Cause Goals
The Supreme Court has indicated that the use of causal factor lan-
guage in a statute "incorporates the traditional tort-law concept of prox-
imate cause." 2 6 This statement suggests that there is a fixed and constant
theoretical and factual application of proximate cause. In defining the
key attributes of proximate cause, however, the federal courts will have
tant to allow recovery for common-law torts for workplace incidents. Id. at 2120.
256. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011).
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the same problems that state courts have had. Harkening back to first-
year torts, many lawyers can remember the confused mash of cases se-
lected to demonstrate the proximate cause inquiry. These cases are
known for their contradictory language and inability to articulate a
common rationale for proximate cause. 257 There is simply no fixed prox-
imate cause analysis. As one court noted:
Although many legal scholars have attempted to lay down a single
standard to determine proximate causation,.. . no satisfactory uni-
versal formula has emerged. Instead, proximate cause is always to
be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent. 25 8
In Staub, for example, the Court described proximate cause as being
concerned with whether there is a "direct relation between the injury as-
serted and the injurious conduct alleged," with whether the cause is "too
remote, purely contingent, or indirect" and with whether the cause was
of "independent origin that was not foreseeable."259 The Supreme Court
did not identify a consistent guiding principle for proximate cause in the
USERRA context. It is likely that courts applying proximate cause anal-
ysis to employment discrimination claims will import different versions
of proximate cause, depending on where they look for guidance.26
Given this malleability, it is not enough for a court to declare that
general notions of proximate cause apply to employment discrimination
statutes generally or to any specific claim. Rather, courts considering
statutory proximate cause questions must also identify the space a par-
ticular claim allows for proximate cause and the specific goal or goals to
be imported. Some or all of those goals may already be addressed in the
statute, leaving little or no space for the court to fill with common-law
ideas. Even if after exploring the statutes' language and purposes, the
court finds there is space for proximate cause, it is unlikely to be a ver-
sion of proximate cause that is coterminous with the common-law doc-
trine.
For example, there is no plausible basis for an employment discrim-
ination proximate cause analysis to be based on concerns about whether
the plaintiff is foreseeable, given the required relationships to state a
cognizable claim and the agency analysis that only imputes liability in
certain instances. As discussed earlier, concerns about intervening ac-
tions are usually not present because employment discrimination doc-
257. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (2011) (noting that common-law proxi-
mate cause "formulations varied, and were often both constricted and difficult to comprehend").
258. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones. 586 S.E.2d 26, 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Atlanta Obstetrics
& Gynecology Grp. v. Coleman, 298 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1990)).
259. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. David W. Robertson, Negligence Liability for Crimes and Intentional Torts Committed by
Others, 67 TUL. L. REv. 135, 138 (1992) (discussing how Louisiana applies a different proximate cause
analysis than the one suggested by the Restatement).
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trine already describes what actors the employer has responsibility for
and in what context. With regard to scope of risk, the factual cause
standards often bracket the scope of liability, specifically indicating when
the defendant should escape liability or be liable for reduced damages.
Importantly, even if the courts are able to select a specific proxi-
mate cause goal to apply to discrimination law, they also will need to
recognize that none of the proximate cause goals have descriptive power
independent of the underlying tort to which the proximate cause analysis
applies. For example, if courts choose the foreseeable plaintiff rationale
for proximate cause, it is impossible to apply traditional negligence ideas
about when the plaintiff is foreseeable because that analysis is being
driven by the underlying goals of negligence law and the other elements
of the negligence analysis.
In other statutory proximate cause cases, the courts have not been
careful to explain which of the proximate cause goals they are applying
to a specific statute or problem.26 1 The Staub case itself contained a col-
lection of selected quotes, rather than a detailed analysis of proximate
cause.26 2 This is especially dangerous in the employment discrimination
context because it suggests that courts are engaging in raw policy-
making, without reference to congressional judgments.
C. Statutes and the Common Law
If courts import proximate cause into discrimination statutes, three
difficult questions would remain. First, should courts look primarily to
the common law to fill arguable gaps? Second, should courts use "pure"
common law or should proximate cause reflect discrimination goals?
Third, should the concept of proximate cause evolve or does it become
frozen in time in the statutory context?
This Article argues that the employment discrimination statutes al-
ready limit liability and that any textual claim that Title VII's statutory
language includes proximate cause is weak. For the sake of argument,
this Section assumes that courts will hold that a proximate-cause-like
principle is needed in federal employment discrimination law.
Even if courts believe that the statutes have a gap that needs filling,
it is not clear why the courts would look to the common law for such a
limit. Title VII's primary operative provisions are exceptions to com-
mon-law assumptions about the relationship between employees and
employers, which are stated in the presumption of at-will employment.
Given this, and the fact that Title VII is a statute, there is little reason to
believe that the common-law idea of proximate cause should be the sole
or even primary source in determining liability limits.
261. Sperino, supra note 182.
262. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192.
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As discussed earlier, there is evidence that state statutes informed
Congress when it enacted Title VII. Another potential source of infor-
mation about liability limits is the complex dialogue between the courts
and Congress about when liability should attach in mixed-motive and
disparate impact cases.
Further, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
could issue regulations interpreting how proximate cause should operate
under the federal discrimination statutes. 263 Under the Chevron doctrine,
courts will defer to an agency's construction of a statute when the under-
lying statutory regime is silent or ambiguous regarding the particular
question, when the agency's interpretation is permissible, and when
Congress has granted authority to the agency to interpret the statute. 264
The administrative deference question becomes tricky, however, in the
discrimination context because Congress has granted the EEOC rule-
making authority under some of the statutory regimes, but not others.265
There is a solid argument that, at least for some of the discrimination
statutes, Congress intended the interstices to be filled by an administra-
tive agency.26
Further, there is a question whether courts should be importing
"pure common law" or whether they should be creating a proximate
cause doctrine that responds to a particular statute, to employment law
broadly, or to employment discrimination law.267 Resolving this issue will
require the courts to consider core issues about statutes generally, such
as whether statutes are separate islands of obligation or whether the
courts' role is to integrate statutes within the broader legal fabric. To
date, the courts have had difficulty with this question and have at times
263. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
264. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44,865-66.
265. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6, 122 Stat. 3553 (granting EEOC
authority to issue regulations); Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle Be-
tween Courts and Agencies over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74 Mo. L. REV. 949, 976-77 (2009)
(discussing how Congress did not provide rulemaking authority to the EEOC under Title VII).
266. Looking to the EEOC for guidance regarding the general question of whether the common
law applies to employment discrimination law does not provide a clear course. While the EEOC has
often explained that it draws from common-law principles in certain areas, a closer examination actu-
ally shows that the EEOC is using the common law as a jumping off point from which to create stand-
ards specific to employment discrimination law. See, e.g., Disparate Impact and Reasonable Factors
Other Than Age Under the ADEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,080, 19,083 (Mar. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1625) (explaining how tort principles could be used to analyze ADEA disparate impact
claims); Brief for the U.S. and the EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Part at 20-21,
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (No. 01-1435), 2002 WL
31746517. In at least one case, the EEOC argued that proximate cause principles apply to discrimina-
tion claims, but the EEOC defined proximate cause as determining whether biased conduct had a neg-
ligible effect on an employment decision. Brief for Respondent at 14, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Los Angeles v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (No. 06-341), 2007 WL 951131.
267. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, Introduction (2006) (discussing how courts import
common-law principles into statutory analysis but vary the underlying principles given the particular
statutory regime).
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created doctrines that unify employment discrimination law, while at
other times creating important distinctions between the primary discrim-
ination statutes.268
If proximate cause is incorporated into Title VII, it also is not clear
whether the concept becomes frozen in time in the statutory context.
When courts import proximate cause into statutes in other instances,
they have ignored temporal orientation problems.269 The meaning of
proximate cause has not remained historically stable and continues to
evolve over time. In theory then, a judge who considers a statutory prox-
imate cause problem from an originalist perspective may therefore be
conceiving a very different version of proximate cause than a judge con-
sidering the modern meaning of the words "proximate cause."270
This issue would come into play in the employment discrimination
context because the major statutes were enacted at different times and
continue to be amended. Section 1981 was originally enacted in 1866.271
Congress enacted Title VII in 1964. Between 1866 and 1964, significant
changes occurred in common-law proximate cause doctrine. Palsgraf,
which is considered to be a leading case regarding proximate cause, was
decided in 1928,272 and the Restatement (First) of Torts was issued in the
1930s. 2 73 If an originalist perspective is used, it is difficult to argue that
the same proximate cause analysis should be applied to § 1981 and Title
VII.274 Additionally, Congress has amended and is likely to keep amend-
ing the employment discrimination statutes' causal language. 275  Courts
continue to interpret the statutes' causal language.2 76 Courts not only will
be required to determine whether the meaning of proximate cause
changes with these underlying amendments and court opinions, but also
whether and how the statutes should respond to changes in the underly-
ing common law.
268. See Sperino, supra note 182.
269. Id.
270. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 n.7 (indicating that the will of Congress is
a "will expressed and fixed in a particular enactment"). See generally CALABRESI, supra note 2 (argu-
ing that courts should have the ability to interpret statutes in response to changed circumstances).
271. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160. 168 n.8 (1976). Even though § 1981 does not contain
causal language, courts often use Title VII disparate treatment frameworks in § 1981 cases. See, e.g.,
Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas to § 1981
claim). Section 1981 provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a) (2006).
272. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
273. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1934).
274. This Article does not generally discuss § 1981.
275. See Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 11th Cong. (2009)
(suggesting changes to causal standards in employment statutes; bill was not enacted); supra Part II.B
(discussing amendments to discrimination statutes).
276. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).
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D. The Inherent Policy Choice
At its core, proximate cause considers whether the defendant
should be liable for all of the consequences of its behavior.277 In other
words, "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of jus-
tice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a cer-
tain point."" If the courts choose to import proximate cause, there is no
clear way to determine which of the doctrine's goals should be enshrined
into the statute. Thus, the courts will be making important choices about
what Title VII provides when it imports proximate cause. Indeed, many
of the goals of proximate cause can only be addressed based on assump-
tions about how the underlying substantive law should respond to com-
peting policy demands.
This is true even if the courts choose to cloak the proximate cause
analysis in textual language. Assume that contrary to the arguments
raised in this Article that a court reasons that Congress imported com-
mon-law proximate cause into Title VII by using the terms "because of."
Given that proximate cause has no independent descriptive power, the
courts will still need to make important policy choices about what proxi-
mate cause means in reference to the elements and goals of the employ-
ment discrimination statutes. However, these choices will be masked in
an analysis that simply purports to adopt non-controversial common-law
principles.
If courts use a gap-filling rationale, they will more explicitly be mak-
ing these policy choices. Allowing courts to develop a liability-limiting
principle like proximate cause makes more sense in traditional tort re-
gimes in which the underlying doctrine is created by the courts and de-
scribed in broad strokes. This is not the case, however, with federal em-
ployment discrimination law. Having courts develop a proximate cause
analysis would allow them to intrude upon an interconnected web of
congressional judgments about how and when liability should be limited.
The statutory regimes already address some of the core policy concerns,
such as the extent of liability being out of proportion to the degree of
wrongfulness and the relative wrongfulness of the actors."
There is good reason to be concerned about the courts' role. First,
in Staub, the Court engaged in cursory reasoning to casually import prox-
imate cause into USERRA.280 Second, the Court's development of agen-
cy principles under Title VII provides a likely roadmap for how the
courts will handle statutory proximate cause.
Staub failed to appreciate, yet alone answer, the complex questions
277. Stapleton, supra note 22, at 951.
278. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928).
279. Stapleton, supra note 22, at 985-86.
280. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011).
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raised by proximate cause. In Staub, the Court made no inquiry into
whether Congress actually adopted USERRA specifically using the
common law as a background. Although the Court noted that intention-
al torts are different than other kinds of torts,281 it did not incorporate this
observation into its proximate cause analysis.
Noticeably, the Court never fully engaged questions regarding
whether it had the authority to import proximate cause into USERRA.
Rather, it assumed with no explicit discussion that because USERRA is a
"tort," that it embraces proximate cause.2 82 When defining proximate
cause, the Court provided a handful of rationales and did not indicate the
specific goal of proximate cause it was trying to effectuate. The Court
indicated that the concept requires a direct relationship between the in-
jury asserted and the conduct alleged and that it excludes "link[s] that
are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect."283 It also noted that a
cause can only be superseding if it is of an origin that was not foresee-
able.21 Staub also failed to draw a clear line between factual cause, prox-
imate cause, and agency principles. For example, in the core pages of the
opinion, it alternated between these ideas without fully discussing how
each would play out in the cat's paw context.285
In Staub, the proximate cause analysis was arguably dicta. Howev-
er, in employment discrimination cases, there are reasons to be con-
cerned that casual statements in one case might be heavily relied upon in
subsequent cases without direct reexamination. In Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, the Court held that sexual harassment claims could proceed,
but then noted, with only a cursory discussion, that the employer would
not be held automatically liable for all harassment that occurred in the
workplace. 286 The Court noted in Meritor that the use of the word
"agent" in Title VII evinced an intent to place a limit on the actions for
which employers would be held liable and then cited the Restatement.27
The Court indicated that agency principles might play a role in such cas-
es, but declined to further describe what role they would play.28
In Faragher and Ellerth, the Court took on the question left open in
Meritor. In Faragher, the Court transformed Meritor's non-committal
phrasing into strong pronouncements. The Court indicated that Meritor
expressed the idea that courts look to the common law of agency to de-
velop employer liability standards, even though Meritor cannot be read
281. Id. at 1191.
282. Id. at 1193.
283. Id. at 1192 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010)).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1191-93.
286. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71-72 (1986).
287. Id. at 72.
288. Id.
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this broadly.29 Although the Faragher Court noted that the Meritor
Court cautioned that "common-law principles may not be transferable in
all their particulars to Title VII," the Faragher Court transformed Meri-
tor's citing of the Restatement into an embrace of common-law agency
principles."
With this move, agency principles entered Title VII with very little
discussion about why they should be imported. The Court's agency anal-
ysis is a great example of how casual references in one case can be repur-
posed as foundational discussions for later cases. Noticeably, the Court
did not seriously grapple with whether Title VII, either descriptively or
normatively, was created against a backdrop of the common law. None
of the opinions engaged in a searching analysis of the text, intent, or pur-
pose of Title VII with regard to whether the statutes contain common-
law agency principles. Nor did the Court explore what the use of the
common law in the statutory regime says about the appropriate link be-
tween the common law and statutes.
After using the label of common-law agency, the Court then created
an agency analysis for Title VII that does not mimic the common law of
agency. The Supreme Court held that employers will be automatically
liable if they take a tangible employment action against employees.2 91 In
cases where the employer does not take a tangible employment action,
the employer can prevail if it provides a two-part affirmative defense.
The Court thus used the common-law label of agency to justify cre-
ating a completely different agency analysis for Title VII claims."* Pro-
fessor Michael Harper noted the Court "cited no common law cases in
their cursory, formal, and rather abstract discussion of the Restatement
exception on which they relied."293
Even though Faragher and Ellerth were issued on the same day,
they did not create a uniform rationale for why agency analysis should be
imported into Title VII. For example, in Ellerth, the Court's opinion fo-
cused on the strands of agency analysis that impute liability to the em-
ployer when the employer is aided by the agency relationship.2 94 In Fara-
gher, by contrast, the Court noted that liability might be imputed because
289. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791 (1998).
290. Id. at 792.
291. Id. at 807.
292. Id. at 797, 802 n.3 (noting that "[tihe proper analysis here, then, calls not for a mechanical
application of indefinite and malleable factors" from the Restatement and also indicating in a footnote
that the Court was not using pure common law). See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exac-
erbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their
Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66 (1995) (describing how Title VII agency principles do not mimic
common-law agency).
293. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional Ra-
tionale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41,55 (1999).
294. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1998).
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the supervisor is aided by the employer, 295 but also noted that liability
might be appropriate because the supervisor is acting as a proxy for the
company 296 or because the supervisor is acting within the scope of his au-
thority. 2" Even stranger, Faragher then appears to not rely on any of
these rationales and instead conducts "an inquiry into the reasons that
would support a conclusion that harassing behavior ought to be held
within the scope of a supervisor's employment." 298
Faragher and Ellerth demonstrate how a Title VII proximate cause
analysis might develop. Choosing a consistent theoretical reason (or
even set of reasons) is important, because the theoretical choice can lead
to dramatically different outcomes in cases. For example, if the courts
view proximate cause as centering on whether the plaintiff is foreseeable,
then proximate cause analysis should play no limiting role because the
discrimination statutes define those who may be foreseeably harmed.
Not only did the Supreme Court fail to resolve the proper theoreti-
cal basis for importing agency principles, it could not even agree on the
proper source from which to derive those principles. For example,
Ellerth relied heavily on the Restatement, which it believed enunciated
the "general common law of agency, rather than ... the law of any par-
ticular State."" However, Faragher explicitly rejected "a mechanical
application of indefinite and malleable factors set forth in the Restate-
ment."3 0
This same dynamic is likely to play out in the proximate cause con-
text. As discussed throughout this Article, proximate cause is articulated
differently, depending on the source. Thus, if courts import proximate
cause, there will either be disagreement about appropriate sources or the
courts will pretend that the sources are more uniform than they really
are.
Even though the courts will purport to apply common-law princi-
ples, they are likely to not apply even the "general common law" as ar-
ticulated in sources, but rather change the underlying common-law prin-
ciples to fit with employment discrimination."o' In adopting an agency
analysis for Title VII, the Court specifically noted that "common-law
principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII."1302
This caveat changed the underlying agency analysis in important ways.
295. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791.
296. Id. at 790.
297. Id. at 791.
298. Id. at 797.
299. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
300. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797.
301. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755.
302. Id. at 764 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)). In Faragher,
the Court appears to rely more heavily on a prior Title VII case than it does on common-law agency
principles. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792.
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For example, in the agency cases, the Court created an affirmative de-
fense to liability in cases where a supervisor harasses an employee but
does not commit a tangible employment action.3 03 In doing so, the Court
indicated that it was accommodating "the agency principles of vicarious
liability," as well as "Title VII's equally basic policies of encouraging
forethought by employers."" The affirmative defense has no corollary
in common law.
After all of these retreats from the common-law standard, it is fair
to say that the Supreme Court did not import common-law agency into
Title VII, but rather used vague and amorphous ideas centered around a
theme of agency to create a new analysis for Title VII. It is likely this
same dynamic will play out in the proximate cause context.30 This raises
serious questions about whether the courts should be able to use the lan-
guage of proximate cause to engage in raw policymaking about the prop-
er reach of employment discrimination law. Further, it is strange that the
courts feel the need to invoke the mantle of the common law in cases
that depart dramatically from the common law. If the courts want to
claim the ability to engage in such far-reaching gap filling, they should do
so explicitly and explain both why they have the authority to do so and
why they are making the policy choices they are making.
The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the employment dis-
crimination statutes in the past, and Congress has repeatedly been re-
quired to amend the statutes to change the court-created results. It is
likely that the courts will find ways to use proximate cause to render
summary judgment in favor of the employer, even in cases that should
arguably proceed to jury trial. It is not likely an accident that concerns
about proximate cause in employment discrimination law are arising
near the same time that the Supreme Court was asked to consider certi-
fying the largest employment discrimination case ever.3
Importing proximate cause into Title VII raises difficult questions.
When courts have used proximate cause in other statutes, they have not
convincingly addressed these issues,3" and there is little reason to think
they will do so in discrimination law.
303. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
304. Id. at 764.
305. An even worse outcome would be if courts selectively drew upon proximate cause principles
that were not modified for the employment discrimination context.
306. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). It is also worth noting that the
Chamber of Commerce strenuously argued in favor of applying tort proximate cause principles in
Staub. Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 19-22, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400), 2010 WL
3611964.
307. Sperino, supra note 182.
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V. THE FUTURE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
Despite the imprecision of proximate cause and the problems that it
creates in the statutory context, it might be argued that proximate cause
is still useful to handle bizarre or attenuated cases."' This Part demon-
strates why the courts do not need to reach for proximate cause. It also
argues that a recent Supreme Court case considering proximate cause is-
sues under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)30 provides a
better model for employment discrimination statutes.
A. Proximate Cause Is Unnecessary
As a descriptive matter, there should be few employment discrimi-
nation cases that even arguably raise proximate cause questions. Em-
ployment discrimination law differs from traditional tort law in that em-
ployment discrimination law is not a field in which a duty is owed "to the
whole world." 10 This key difference renders many core proximate cause
concerns moot in the run-of-the-mill employment discrimination case.
As established in Part II, the run-of-the-mill employment discrimination
case is unlikely to require proximate cause, given all of the limits already
applied to such claims.3 '
The classic scenarios in which courts invoke proximate cause are
marked by freakishness or attenuation.312 For example, in Palsgraf, a
passenger carrying an unmarked package of fireworks dropped the pack-
age as he was being helped onto a moving train, resulting in the explo-
sion of the fireworks and the tipping over of a penny scale to injure Ms.
Palsgraf.313 Because employment discrimination cases usually do not in-
volve long causal chains of physical events, they are unlikely to look like
traditional proximate cause cases. Nonetheless, in Staub, the Court used
proximate cause to discuss why cat's paw liability would be appropriate.
One way to think about whether proximate cause should be imported in-
to Title VII is to imagine extreme cat's paw cases and to use those to
demonstrate why proximate cause is unnecessary.
Within the category of intentional discrimination, courts have used
308. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630,2644-52 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 2634 (majority opinion).
310. Stapleton, supra note 22, at 945.
311. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 29 cmt. a ("Ordinarily, the plaintiffs harm is self-
evidently within the defendant's scope of liability and requires no further attention. Thus, scope of
liability functions as a limitation on liability in a select group of cases ..... ).
312. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (positing that proximate cause would limit liability under the Endangered
Species Act when a farmer's fertilizer is lifted by a tornado from tilled fields and deposited miles away
in a wildlife refuge where it harms animals).
313. This is the way the facts in Palsgraf are typically explained. Saul Levmore, The Wagon
Mound Cases: Foreseeability, Causation, and Mrs. Palsgraf, in TORT STORIEs 129, 147-48 (Robert L.
Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
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the term "cat's paw" to describe cases in which one individual acts with a
discriminatory motive, but another individual makes the decision to take
the employment action against the individual. 314 Although the exact con-
tours of the cat's paw theory have not been worked out, these cases often
involve a biased supervisor or co-worker who provides false information
to a decision maker and the decision maker then makes a negative deci-
sion based on the false information."' In Staub, the Supreme Court iden-
tified cat's paw cases as being those cases that arise when the official who
takes an action has "no discriminatory animus but is influenced by previ-
ous company action that is the product of a like animus in someone
else." 31
The Supreme Court has only decided cat's paw liability where a su-
pervisor acted with bias."' Currently, the courts have not determined the
outer limits of cat's paw liability. It is possible, however, to posit the
types of cases in which cat's paw liability might be recognized. It is pos-
sible that courts might entertain cat's paw cases in which a co-worker of
the plaintiff passes on false, negative information about the plaintiff to a
supervisor based on animus and the supervisor then acts on that negative
evaluation. It also is possible that a supervisor could place a facially neu-
tral false evaluation in an employee's file based on discriminatory ani-
mus. The employer could then use the information in a different context
to take a negative action against the employee. For example, consider a
case in which a supervisor rates an employee as needing improvement in
an evaluation. During a subsequent reduction in force, another employ-
ee might use the negative evaluation to terminate the plaintiff.
Thus, some cat's paw cases have attributes that might make proxi-
mate cause analysis tempting. Cat's paw cases always involve multiple
actors. The actors are often acting at different periods of time and based
on differing motives. And, it is possible that the actions of the discrimi-
natory actor may be distant in time from the action that is taken against
the employee.
Still, proximate cause is not necessary to resolve cat's paw cases.
First, cat's paw theory is still in its infancy. If past substantive develop-
ments in employment discrimination serve as a guide, it is likely the Su-
preme Court will find ways to substantively limit cat's paw cases.31 8 Staub
314. See supra note 13; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151-52
(2000) (holding that the fact that the official decision maker did not harbor animus was not control-
ling, because the individual with the animus was the decision maker behind the plaintiff's termination).
315. See supra Part I.A.
316. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
317. Id. at 1194.
318. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court's Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 281 (2011) (discussing the Supreme Court's response to
the 1991 amendments to Title VII).
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hints at what some of these limits might be."'
Even assuming for the sake of argument a broadly defined cat's paw
theory, none of the traditional reasons for applying proximate cause
principles apply to it. The most applicable argument would be one of su-
perseding cause-that the later non-discriminatory act of the decision
maker cuts off liability for the original actor. The Supreme Court explic-
itly rejected this argument in Staub, reasoning that to be superseding the
second event must not be foreseeable.320
Superseding cause is likely not the right legal concept, as the cat's
paw cases involve a second non-culpable act breaking the chain of causa-
tion. In tort law, superseding cause is usually used in cases where the
second event is criminal in nature or tortious, where the intervening
force operates independently of the original action, and/or where the
second act is extraordinary in nature.3 21 Further, a cause is not supersed-
ing if the action of the original actor created the same risk of harm that
was brought about by the second action.32 2 Consider the reduction in
force scenario discussed above. When a supervisor records a negative
evaluation in a file of an employee, that supervisor reasonably antici-
pates that a job-related consequence will happen to a particular person.
What a court might be concerned about in such a scenario is wheth-
er it is fair or proper as a matter of public policy to hold the employer li-
able. It does not follow, however, that proximate cause would be the
right doctrine to resolve the problem. As discussed throughout this Arti-
cle, there are only weak textual, intent, or purpose-based arguments in
favor of proximate cause, and the employment discrimination statutes do
not map well onto common-law torts. Further, once proximate cause is
invoked, the courts are left without guidance about how to choose be-
tween its multiple, contested goals to solve the policy-based problem.
It might be tempting to argue that in these instances the employer is
an innocent party to whom liability should not attach. However, when
making a policy choice between the plaintiff and the employer, there are
strong arguments in favor of placing liability on the employer. First, all
of the employment discrimination statutes have the broad, liberal pur-
pose of prohibiting employment discrimination. Second, the employer is
the party best able to minimize discrimination. It controls the processes
it uses to engage in official decision making, including the decision to
319. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191-93 (discussing factual cause and agency principles).
320. Id. at 1192.
321. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1965) (listing circumstances in which second
event will be superseding); id. § 442A (noting that the second act is not superseding if the original ac-
tor creates or increases the risk of harm); id. § 447 (discussing negligence of second actor). The con-
cept of superseding cause may be of diminishing importance in the Restatement. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 23, § 34 cmt. a (discussing how importance of superseding cause is diminishing in
tort cases),
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B (1965).
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have an attenuated chain of decision makers. It controls the training it
gives regarding those processes. It controls whether decision makers
conduct independent investigations of the underlying facts and how
strenuous those investigations are. The "bad" actors in a cat's paw case
would be employees of the company or those for whom the company
would be liable under an agency or negligence analysis.?3 All of the
wrongful actions for which the plaintiff would be suing would be con-
nected to the workplace.
Further, the underlying goals of Title VII strongly militate against
using common-law proximate cause. As one commentator has ex-
plained:
Title VII exists to strike down an entire socio-economic structure of
conduct (which it forbids) and attitudes and expectations (which it
is meant to change by the moral force and suasion of the law). This
interpretation of Title VII is in harmony with Title VII's plain lan-
guage, which simply forbids any discrimination, any different treat-
ment "because of . . .race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."3 2 4
The Supreme Court has indicated that Title VII does not tolerate dis-
crimination "subtle or otherwise."3 25  Given these important differences
between tort law and Title VII, it is difficult to argue that the same liabil-
ity limits should exist for both.
Another policy-based argument in the cat's paw scenario is that it is
unrealistic to expect an employer to go to the expense that investigating
potential cat's paw cases would entail. As with many pockets of em-
ployment discrimination cases, other parts of employment discrimination
doctrine can do the heavy lifting in this regard. As discussed earlier, it is
likely that the courts will limit the kind of cat's paw cases that will create
liability. They will likely do this by limiting the cases in which the plain-
tiff will be able to establish factual cause,2 6 by balancing the non-
discrimination mandate with the at-will doctrine, by allowing employers
to take advantage of available affirmative defenses,327 and by employing
the tight administrative filing requirements to limit the claims that can be
brought. Further, it is likely that the courts will use the special agency
323. In Staub, the Court expressed no view about liability for information provided by co-
workers. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4.
324. Gudel, supra note 113, at 98.
325. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,801 (1973).
326. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 (discussing the motivating factor standard); Christian v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877 (6th Cir. 2001) (indicating that the plaintiff "must offer evidence that the
supervisor's racial animus was the cause of the termination or somehow influenced the ultimate deci-
sionmaker"); see also Befort & Olig, supra note 144, at 402 (discussing how causation analysis should
operate in cat's paw cases); Sara Atherton Mason, Note, Cat's Paw Cases: The Standard for Assessing
Subordinate Bias Liability, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435 (2011) (discussing the various standards courts
have used in cat's paw cases).
327. For example, an employer can establish that it would have made the same decision without
considering the protected trait. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
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analysis developed for Title VII to limit employer liability.',
More importantly, there is some value to identifying actions taken
in part based on a protected trait as discrimination, even if other ways
are used to reduce or eliminate liability. In the Title VII context, Con-
gress found it preferable to reduce the available damages in certain
mixed-motive cases, rather than declare what happened to the plaintiff as
falling outside the realm of discrimination. If proximate cause becomes
an element of a discrimination claim that a plaintiff must prove, then the
employer will not face liability for discrimination if the plaintiff is unable
to prove it.
This idea that it is expressively better to label certain conduct as dis-
criminatory is seen in the Court's agency analysis with regard to supervi-
sors. Indeed, even though the agency analysis is flawed, it may do much
of the work that might otherwise fall to proximate cause, determining
which sets of actions that occur in the workplace will be imputed to the
employer. The difference between using proximate cause and agency
principles to limit liability is important for several reasons. First, as theo-
retically inconsistent as the agency doctrine is, the courts have already
invested time interpreting and analyzing it. Second, the agency analysis
still leaves room for a court to declare conduct as violating the statute,
even if the defendant is not held liable for the particular infraction. This
is an important difference.
B. Roadmap for Future Proximate Cause Cases
Future courts considering proximate cause in the discrimination
context should reject applying the concept to Title VII, the ADEA, or
the ADA. As this Article has demonstrated, there is scant textual, in-
tent, or purpose-based support for using proximate cause. More im-
portantly, there is little reason to assume that Congress adopted these
statutes' primary operative language against the backdrop of the com-
mon law or that Congress intended to keep common-law causal concepts
after creating exceptions to at-will employment that altered the common-
law relationship between employees and employers.
Importantly, if courts use proximate cause in employment discrimi-
nation statutes, they cannot credibly argue that a singular concept of
proximate cause exists or that the common law uniformly defines the
term. Rather, courts must recognize that proximate cause is an umbrella
term that describes an evolving doctrine with contested goals.
If a court imports proximate cause into discrimination law, it must
at least identify the goal or goals it is using and describe why these goals
328. The Court in Staub suggested that agency analysis might later be used to limit employer lia-
bility for cat's paw cases. 131 S. Ct. at 1192; Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d
277 (4th Cir. 2004) (using agency principles to limit employer liability in cat's paw case).
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are not adequately addressed by the existing statutory regime. At the
very least, courts must acknowledge that statutory proximate cause in the
discrimination context should not be coterminous with common-law
proximate cause. Using proximate cause will not result in certainty and
will draw courts into larger questions about the appropriate interaction
of the common law and statutes.
In most recent cases in which the Supreme Court considered wheth-
er to apply proximate cause to a statute, the Supreme Court chose to ap-
ply the concept.329 However, in one case, CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
McBride, the Court did not follow this general trend and refused to apply
common-law proximate cause analysis to a case brought under FELA.30
Although Staub and CSX were both issued in the same term, they reach
different conclusions about the appropriate use of proximate cause.
Congress enacted FELA in the early 1900s to respond to the rising
number of railroad accidents affecting railroad employees.33' The statute
provides that railroad common carriers "shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while... employed... for such injury or death
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of the . . . carrier."3 2
While this text may be clearer than the discrimination statutes' language
with regard to proximate cause, FELA sounds in negligence and thus has
arguably closer analytic ties to negligence concepts than discrimination
law.
The CSX opinion raised important points applicable to discrimina-
tion law. The Supreme Court noted that Congress created FELA to
supplant the common law.3 3 The Court also noted that concerns about
absurd results had not actually materialized in FELA cases334 and noted
that other limits within FELA confined the universe of potential
claims.3 It also indicated that the appropriate view of FELA was that it
contained a proximate cause-like restriction, but one that was different
than the common-law concept.336 In a portion of the opinion that was on-
ly joined by four Justices, the Justices noted lack of consensus about the
meaning of proximate cause.3
While CSX provides a model for future employment discrimination
proximate cause analysis, it is a minority opinion in a wider context of
cases that generally favor applying proximate cause to statutes. Further,
Chief Justice Roberts's dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
329. See cases cited supra note 181.
330. 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (2011).
331. Id. at 2636.
332. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
333. CSX, 131 S. Ct. at 2638.
334. Id. at 2641.
335. Id. at 2644.
336. Id. at 2641.
337. Id. at 2642.
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Alito, cited Staub for the proposition that common-law proximate cause
should be applied to FELA.35 While CSX provides a good model for
proximate cause inquiries, there are reasons to be skeptical that it will be
the prevailing model. The case is contrary to the trend in statutory prox-
imate cause cases generally and the courts' recent tendency to interpret
discrimination statutes narrowly.
CONCLUSION
It is likely that courts will use the Staub decision to reflexively im-
port proximate cause principles into employment discrimination law.3 19
This Article argues that using proximate cause in the employment dis-
crimination statutes is unnecessary and fraught with numerous theoreti-
cal, practical, and doctrinal difficulties. It also implicates important ques-
tions regarding separation of powers concerns, the nature of employment
discrimination claims, and the interaction of statutes with the common
law. To date, the courts have not adequately considered the complexity
inherent in statutory proximate cause decisions.
338. Id. at 2645 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
339. See, e.g., Hampton v. Vilsack, 685 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing district court
decision using the term "proximate cause"); Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 352-53
(6th Cir. 2012).
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